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1 INTRODUCTION 
Government intervention in U.S. agriculture has had a long history over the 
last five decades. This continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. farm policy. The 
most important objectives of the farm commodity programs (Johnson, 1973) are 
the following: 
1) Raise the average level of farm incomes to a more satisfactory level. 
2) Achieve a reasonable degree of stability in farm prices and incomes. 
3) Manage the supply of key farm products so that the first two objectives 
can be achieved without imposing unacceptably high costs upon taxpayers and 
consumers. 
4) Improve the capability of U.S. agriculture to compete in international mar­
ket while protecting it carefully but not completely from imports of competitive 
products. 
5) Provide an adequate and stable supply of food and fiber for U.S. consumers 
at reasonable prices. 
To achieve these objectives, nonrecourse loans, a deficiency (direct) payment 
scheme, and acreage controls are currently used. The mechanisms above are not the 
only federal policies influencing agriculture. Others involve taxes, credit, marketing 
orders, research and development, resource development, and extension. By some 
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measures, agriculture receives more federal support relative to importance than any 
other sector of the economy (Congress of the United States, 1984). Specially, the 
U.S. rice industry is mostly influenced by the government policy because the rice 
industry is smaller than other grain industries and most of the rice producing area 
is geographically concentrated. 
Government payments for rice, including the value of PIK (Payment-In-Kind) 
rice, deficiency payment, and diversion payments, comprised more than 60 percent 
of total producer receipts from the 1986 and 1987 crop. Since 1980, the government 
expenditure to the farm value of rice production, excluding P.L.480 and other in­
direct payments, has increased significantly. Direct government payments to rice 
producers during 1980-1987 are shown in Table 1.1. In 1980, the ratio was less than 
1 percent: Government direct payments totaled $2 million and the farm value of 
rice production was a record $1.87 billion. By 1983, however, the ratio rose to more 
than 40 percent: Government direct payments were estimated at $618 million, but 
the farm value of rice production dropped to $876 million. Payments were made to 
19,538 farms and 31,624 farmers. The average payment per farm and farmers were 
$31,925 and $19,542, respectively. Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas received nearly 
75 percent of the total payments issued through government programs during this 
period. Since the Food Security Act of 1985, the ratio has increased significantly 
and reached more than 60 percent in 1986. As a result, the government policy, 
directly and indirectly, plays a leading and growing role in the U.S. rice industry. 
3 
Table 1.1: Ratio of Direct Payments to the Farm Value of Rice Production, 1980 — 
1987® 
Crop Farm Direct Direct Payment as 
Year Value Payments Total Income a Share of Total Income 
million dollars percent 
1980 1893 2 1875 0.11 
1981 1654 22 1676 1.31 
1982 1246 267 1513 17.65 
1983 876 618 1494 41.37 
1984 1119 380 1499 25.35 
1985 881 721 1602 45.01 
1986 520 1025 1545 66.34 
1987 544 993 1537 64.61 
°ASCS Commodity Fact Sheets for rice, 1977-1987, USD A. 
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Although domestic prices have been relatively stable under government pro­
grams, rice farmers and U.S. government have been giving more attention to the 
world rice market. The U.S. exports more than 60 percent of domestic rice produc­
tion and has had an average share of about 20 percent of the world's rice exports. 
The world rice market is inherently unstable with respect to price and sources 
of demand and supply. With a limited number of traders, one unexpected or new 
buyer can have dramatic consequences on trade, and hence on prices. Small swings 
in foreign demand can exert relatively quick and strong impacts on rice prices. A 
sudden upturn or downturn in demand of a key importer, or a seller unexpected as 
caught with a large exportable surplus and inadequate storage, will affect equally 
sharp price swings. For example. South Korea imported more than 1-million metric 
tons from the U.S. and more than 1-million metric tons from other small exporters in 
1980, which encouraged world prices to increase sharply. And, a sudden increase in 
Indonesian exports discouraged major exporters, U.S. and Thailand, causing them 
to reduce their prices to maintain historical export levels. 
Most nations that import rice also have protectionist policies that cushion their 
producers and consumers from the impacts of fluctuations in world market prices. 
Thus, the U.S., because of its relatively free trade practices and open agricultural 
markets, bears much of the burden of adjusting to changes in world trade. Small 
swings in the stream of imports can cause major changes in the cost of operating 
the U.S. rice program. Even if there exist high price-unresponsiveness in individual 
importing countries, the responsiveness of the aggregate excess demand functions 
can be quite high in a market with many importing countries (McCalla and Josling, 
1985). As a result, small swings in foreign demand for world rice market are im-
portant to supply, demand, and price determination in the U.S. rice market as well 
as U.S. Government costs and U.S. farmers' expected returns. 
A notable aspect of the international rice market is that Thailand, as the largest 
exporter and competitor to the U.S., has contributed to price and export variability 
in the U.S. rice market as well as in the world market. In short, the export policy 
of Thailand can have dramatic consequences on supply, demand, and prices in the 
U.S. rice market. Since rice is Thailand's highest valued agricultural commodity, 
highest valued export crop, and major foreign exchange earning (refer to Chapter 
3), the Thailand government intervenes at many stages of rice production and trade 
(Vesdapunt et al. 1984), Interventions include input supply, market development, 
paddy price support, domestic milled price maintenance, and rice export control. 
However, the major form of government intervention is the rice export control policy, 
especially the rice premium, export tax, and rice reserve requirement. The overall 
objectives of Thailand's rice policy under the Fifth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1982-1986) remain almost unchanged from the period of the 
Fourth Plan (1977-1981), i.e., to raise rice production to meet increasing domestic 
consumption, to maintain exportable availabilities, to keep the domestic rice price 
low and stable, to earn government revenue from rice exports, and to change the 
export price of rice strategically for obtaining bargaining power in response to the 
changing international rice market situation (FAO, 1985). In order to achieve these 
objectives, the Thailand government has been imposing a rice export tax, among 
other things. As mentioned by USD A, ERS (Rice, Situation and outlook yearbook, 
1988), when Thailand prices declined due to a reduction in the tax, the U.S. had 
to make a sharp downward price adjustment to remain competitive. Thailand's 
changed export-oriented policies undercut the U.S. exports. Thus, the policies of 
Thailand government play a crucial role in the U.S. rice market. 
1.1 Objectives 
The general objective of this study is to develop an economic model for evalu­
ating the effects of policy on the U.S. rice market. More specifically the objectives 
are: 
1) to develop the Stackelberg duopoly model in the world rice market in order 
to better understand the U.S. rice market, linked heavily with the world rice market. 
2) to develop and estimate an econometric model of the U.S. rice market, with 
particular emphasis on explaining the simultaneous behavioral relationships among 
supply, demand, and prices. 
3) to examine the dynamics of the supply and price formation process in the 
international rice market, and 
4) to analyze effects of exogenous changes in the policy instruments such as U.S. 
support prices, the export tax of the Thailand government, and sudden changes in 
world demand on supply, demand, prices, U.S. government program costs, and the 
returns of rice farmers in the U.S. rice market. 
1.2 Organization 
The study is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a brief description of the 
U.S. rice economy. It reviews the structure of U.S. rice farms, the U.S. role in the 
world rice market, historical background for U.S. farm programs, and major rela­
tionships in the U.S. rice economy. In Chapter 3, a theoretical framework with U.S. 
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and Thailand policy mechanisms in the world rice market is illustrated. Structure 
and components of the model are developed in Chapter 4 to capture the impacts 
of policy alternatives, and world demand fluctuations on the U.S. rice economy. 
Chapter 5 reviews the estimation procedure, the final estimated equations, and in­
terpretations of the results. Validation tests of the estimated model are treated in 
Chapter 6. Chapter 7 analyzes the impacts of policy alternatives and world demand 
fluctuations on the U.S. rice market. The impacts are evaluated through dynamic 
simulation analysis using the estimated model described in Chapter 5 and the base 
simulation results. Hypothetical changes in policies and world demand are intro­
duced to perform dynamic simulations. A comparison of the simulation results with 
the base simulation results is used to show the impact of these changes. Finally, a 
summary and conclusions of the research and suggestions for further research are 
presented in Chapter 8. 
2 U.S. RICE ECONOMY 
Rice ranks ninth among major field crops in value of production and more than 
sixty percent of U.S. rice production is exported to the rest of the world. Most of to­
tal U.S. rice crop is produced by six states (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, 
Missouri, and California). Florida, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee are 
the minor producing states, but the share of these states is less than one percent 
of total U.S. production. In four southern states (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Texas) rice comprises 10 percent of the field crop value. Altogether, the six rice 
producing States supply from 18 to 25 percent of the world's rice exports. Domestic 
food consumption is small in comparison with other cereal foods. For example, food 
consumption of both wheat and rice accounts for roughly a third of total domestic 
use of these cereals. But, domestic consumers consume eight times as much wheat 
as rice. The U.S. is the second largest rice exporter, next to Thailand. The high 
ratio of exports to domestic use makes the U.S. rice industry heavily dependent 
upon the world rice market. 
2.1 Structure of Rice Farms 
According to the 1978 Census of Agriculture, 10,849 farms harvested just over 
3 million acres of rice and all acreage was irrigated. Table 2.1 shows that the 
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Arkansas 4,732 35.9 228 4,447 
Louisiana 2,732 16.8 220 3,742 
Mississippi 579 6.8 373 4,243 
Texas 1,393 20.8 429 4,652 
Missouri 153 0.8 163 4,095 
South total 9,589 81.1 263 4,307 
California 1,258 18.9 386 5,219 
Total'» 10,849 100.0 277 4,454 
'^USDÂ, ERS. 1984. Rice, Background for 1985 Farm Legislation. 
^Includes some farms in minor rice-producing States; Florida, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 
« 
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average size of rice farms was 277 acres. Roughly 38 percent of the farms harvested 
250 or more acres, and they produced three-quarters of the 1978 rice crop. Farms 
harvesting less than 100 acres of rice comprised more than a quarter of all rice 
farms, but contributed less than 5 percent of U.S. rice production. Arkansas has 
the greatest number of rice farms, but Texas and California has the largest farms. 
The average yield in 1978 was 4,454 pounds of rice per acre. Larger farms achieved 
the highest yields. Yields on farms of 1,000 or more acres averaged nearly 130 
pounds an acre higher. Table 2.2 shows that the number of rice farms by size and 
share of output, 1978. 
2.2 The U.S. Role in The World Rice Market 
Normally, U.S. contributes 2 percent to the world rice production. In 1983/1984, 
because of a 30 percent PIK-induced decline in production, U.S. rice was just 1 per­
cent of the world's production. Nevertheless, the U.S. will likely reclaim 18 percent 
of world rice trade, following the lead position of Thailand. In recent years, U.S. 
has provided almost 25 percent of the world's rice exports. Thus, while the U.S. 
rice crop is insignificant in comparison to world production, its impact on trade is 
large. Moreover, U.S. rice is a source of stability in an often volatile, unreliable 
world rice market. The entire U.S. rice crop is flood irrigated, promoting stable 
supplies. Production capacity is resilient and far outweighs domestic requirements. 
These factors, in addition to some government program provisions that help pro­
mote stability and intensive cultivation, assure a reliable supply of rice for export. 
Major customers for U.S. rice exports have changed over the past 30 years 




Table 2.2: Number of Rice Farms by Size and Share of Output, 1978* 










number percent percent pounds 
1 - 99 2,969 27.3 4.8 4,306 
100 - 249 3,745 34.5 20.0 4,394 
250 - 499 2,561 23.6 28.9 4,377 
500 - 999 1,201 11.0 26.9 4,522 
1,000 or more 373 3.4 19.5 4,583 
Total ^ 10,849 100.0 100 4,454 
®USDA, ERS.1984. Rice, Background for 1985 Farm Legislation. 
^Columns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 
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countries have redefined their positions from net importers to self-sufficiency or net 
exporters. In the 1950s, Cuba, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia were the biggest 
markets for U.S. rice. In the 1960s, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia remained strong 
markets, but demand for U.S. rice also grew in Western Europe, South Korea, South 
Vietnam, and South Africa. Japan was a significant importer of rice through 1966. 
By the end of the 1960s, India ceased importing U.S. rice and Pakistan became a 
major exporter. Relations were severed with Cuba early in the decade, ending rice 
trade, but markets opened in the Middle East and Africa. 
During the 1970s, the Middle East and Africa developed into two of the strongest 
markets for U.S. rice. In the later case the increase was due in part to subsidized 
exports. Asian markets, with the exception of Indonesia, have come and gone 
throughout the decade. The European Community and Canada have remained sta­
ble but small markets for U.S. rice. During the 1980s, the U.S. has lost its market 
share in selected countries. The segment of the international market growing im­
port demand for rice has shifted to Thailand on the basis of more attractive prices. 
For the first time in several years, it looks as though the U.S. has lost a premium 
market in Nigeria, previously large buyer of U.S. rice. Again, Nigeria, which has 
suffered a loss of foreign exchange, has not reduced its demand for rice, but turned 
to Thailand for cheaper rice to accommodate domestic demand. 
2.3 Historical Background for U.S. Rice Farm Programs 
Scarce supplies, favorable prices, and rapid improvements in production tech­
nology in the world following World War II resulted in a rapid expansion of rice 
acreage and production in the U.S. and abroad. In 1954, rice production exploded 
4 
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Table 2.3. Top Five Customers for U.S. Rice, 1973-1985 Crop Year°^ 
_ 
Country 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 
S. Vietnam lb  
Kampuchea 2b 4b 
S. Korea 36 16 2 5 1 1 2 3 5 
Saudi Arabia 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 1 2 2 
S. Africa 5 5 4 3 5 
Iran 2 3 1 2 1 
Iraq 5 5 2 4 1 2 1 1 
Bangladesh 3 1 
Indonesia 2 1 2 3 4 
Nigeria 3 3 4 5 2 1 4 
Italy 5 5 
Bel./Lux. 5 4 3 3 
Peru 5 
Canada 4 5 
Senegal 4 
Share of 
U.S. Exports 50.3 68.4 46.5 55.6 58.0 
percent 
48.3 52.4 61.4 52.0 46.4 57.7 47.8 47.9 
^USDA, Agricultural Statistics (various issues). 
^denotes P.L. 480 customer. All others are commercial buyers. 
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to a record 64 million cwt, over twice the average during World War 2. However, 
with the expanding supplies and weak demand, world prices declined, and carry­
over stocks surged to 27 million cwt, seven times greater than the average of the 
previous 3 years. World prices dropped and average U.S. prices received by farmers 
were below support prices. To maintain domestic prices the near support level, the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) made nonrecourse loans and accumulated 
large stocks of rice. Subsequent high domestic prices meant that traders could not 
export rice without absorbing a loss. As a result, U.S. exports declined sharply and 
carryover reached a high. All this led to adoption of a government program and 
export subsidy programs for rice. 
During the period which land allotments, marketing quotas, and an export 
subsidy program for rice were in effect (1955-1973), prices received by farmers were 
stable and above support price levels. 
During the 1970s, domestic use and exports of U.S. rice rose sharply while 
world prices were above the U.S. loan rates. In 1973, the average farm price was 
$ 13.80 a cwt, compared with a support level of $ 6.07. The Rice Production Act 
of 1975 reflected these changed conditions and shifted rice production control from 
allotments and quotas to greater market orientation along the lines of the programs 
for other grains. The export subsidy was also stopped at that time. A target price 
and direct (deficiency) payments were established. The allotments became the 
payment base. Farmers could now plant in excess of their allotments, but eligibility 
for loans and deficiency payments was restricted to rice from allotted acres. 
During the 1980s, rice stocks again rose and prices fell because of the world 
rice market conditions (i.e., specially, Thailand export policy and slowed economic 
15 
growth in importing countries). From the late 1950s, Thailand imposed domestic 
sales quotas and reduced the export tax. Hence, it had a restrictive export policy. 
However, in the early 1980s, Thailand adopted a more export-oriented policy and 
expanded its market share in the world rice market. Thus, the U.S. market share 
of world trade in the 1980s has been falling in comparison with that of Thailand. 
In Figure 2.1, the decline in U.S. rice exports since 1980 and at the same time the 
increase in Thailand rice exports are shown. 
To solve the problems that rising production capacity, weak foreign demand for 
U.S. rice, hefty supplies and stocks, farm prices below target prices, and increasing 
government costs were causing, the Food Security Act of 1985 introduced greater 
market orientation in U.S. farm policy. 
2.4 Major Relationships in the U.S. Rice Economy 
Supply and demand relationships for rice are unusually complex chiefly because 
domestic prices, export prices, and utilization in several outlets are determined 
simultaneously not only by the supply of rice, but also by factors outside the rice 
market structure. The rice economy for the U.S. can be viewed as influenced by 
four sets of factors, those affecting 1) domestic production, 2) world production and 
price, 3) domestic utilization, and 4) exports. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the principal economic relationships and variables in­
volved in the U.S. rice economy. The top of Figure 2.2 shows the forces affecting 
rice production, yield, and acreage. With land allotments (or other acreage pro­
grams) or price supports, such physical factors as weather, cultural practices, and 
insect-disease controls are often more important than economic forces in deter-
4 
4 




Figure 2.1: The Export Share of U.S. and Thailand 
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mining year-to-year changes in production. With allotments limiting acreage to 
specified levels and price supports stabilizing prices, rice producers have responded 
by adopting new cultural practices to increase yields. Under these conditions, the 
changing technology becomes a significant causal factors. 
In the lower left of Figure 2.2 are indicated selected factors affecting world 
production, prices, and utilization. Knowing what factors determine the world 
price of rice is important to domestic producers, since the U.S. normally exports 
more than sixty percent of its rice production. Except when prices are supported by 
government programs, market (not support) prices received by domestic producers 
normally reflect the world supply and demand situation. Logically, the world price 
of rice is determined by the world supply, the quantity available for export, income 
and policies in the major importing countries, and the supply of competing grains 
(e.g., wheat). However, export policy of Thailand, as the largest export market 
supplier, played a crucial role in the world rice market as well as the U.S. rice 
market during the 1980s. 
Domestic outlets indicated in Figure 2.2 are food, industry, seed, and carryover. 
Utilization levels in the first two outlets are assumed to depend partly on price, 
income, consumption trends (i.e., changes in habits and population), and partly on 
prices of competing commodities. 
Trade in any commodity implies relative surpluses and deficits. In countries 
having an advantage in rice production, production in most years may exceed do­
mestic requirements. This holds true for the U.S. which exports more than sixty 
percent of its production. U.S. exports are influenced by conditions at home and 
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Figure 2.2: The Structure of the U.S. Rice Economy 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Non-Cooperative Duopoly Model in the World Rice Market 
Thailand is currently the largest rice exporting country with 30 percent of 
the market share, while the U.S. is the second largest rice exporter with 18-25 
percent of the market share. As recently as the late 1970s, the U.S. and Thailand 
exported about 50 percent of world trade. During that period, Thailand imposed 
export taxes and domestic sales quotas for exporters. Hence, it had a restrictive 
export policy. In the early 1980s, however, Thailand adopted a more export-oriented 
policy and expanded its market share, because rice brought more than 20 percent 
of agricultural GDP at current market prices and around 30 percent of agricultural 
export earnings. The regulation of private export trade has been reduced with the 
abolition of the quota system (1980), the suspension of the rice reserve requirement 
in export taxes and in the export premium (1983). Moreover, exporters were helped 
by a further expansion of credit for their purchase of rice and of rediscount facilities 
for exports^. Meanwhile, the U.S. government also adopted more export-oriented 
policy. Among other things, a lower support price will lead to increase exports and 
to reduce government stocks. 
^A comprehensive survey on the Thailand rice industry, including a policy re­
view, is given by FAG, 1985; Economic and Social Development Paper 54. 
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This situation in the world rice market can be a kind of trade war as mentioned 
by Sampson and Snape (1980). The common approach to the issue applies the 
oligopoly analysis familiar to those acquainted with intermediate microeconomics. 
However, a duopoly approach rather than an oligopolistic approach is appropriate 
for the world rice market. Even though the U.S., Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, and 
China supply 65 to 70 percent of world exports, the U.S. and Thailand supply 
more than 50 percent of the markets, and only these two countries have storage 
facilities in sufficient volume to permit holding, an ability essential to duopolistic 
pricing. The behavior of others is more akin to that of the smaller exporters and can 
be characterized as following the price set by the duopolists. Following Paarlberg 
and Abbott (1986), U.S. and Thailand have potential market power because of 
substantial market shares and existence of institutions through which market power 
may be exercised. 
Furthermore, price leadership by Thailand arises primarily^. Following Mc-
Calla (1966), the U.S. is willing to let Thailand lead and chooses to be a price 
follower, first because of the U.S. domestic agricultural policy, and second because 
of the U.S. foreign policy. While the Thailand government has direct control over 
all prices (domestic and export prices) and quantity, the USDA has indirect control 
over the market. State and private trading companies in the U.S. do not exercise 
their market power as the Thailand government does in the world rice market. 
Moreover, in terms of production capacity, production costs, available stocks, and 
^Price leadership and appropriate market structure in the various world grain 
market were investigated by Alaouze et al. (1978), Carter and Schmitz (1979), 
Kolstad and Burris (1986), McCalla (1966), McCalla and Josling (1981), Mendulson 




financial resources, Thailand is in the position to be a dominant price leader. For 
example, an average farm price of rice in the U.S. is four times higher than that 
in Thailand during the period of this study. It implies that Thailand faces lower 
production costs than U.S. does so that Thailand has absolute advantage in the 
for world rice market. 
The following model explains this type of price arrangement of exporters' mar­
ket power (i.e., Stackelberg duopoly model). Consider a market in which two firms, 
Firm 1 and Firm 2, produce a homogenous product. The inverse demand function 
states price as a function of the aggregate quantity sold: 
where Çl and Qg are the level of the duopolists' output. The total revenue of each 
duopolist depends upon his own output level and that of his rival. So, the profit 
of each equals his total revenue less his cost, which depends upon his output level 
alone: 
Setting the appropriate partial derivatives of (3.2) and (3.3) equal to zero. 
world trade As the result, a duopoly approach under price leading is appropriate 
P  =  P ( Q i + Q 2 )  (3.1) 
III = P { Q \ + Q 2 ) - Q \ - C I { Q \ )  





^Siamwalla and Stephen (1983) argued that the areas of mainland Monsoon Asia 
have a comparative advantage in rice production with the traditional low-input 
technology as a consequence of their favorable man-land ratio. 
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DQ2 DQ2 (3.5) 
The terms dQ2/dQ\ and dQ\/ dQ2 represent the 'conjectural variation', i.e., 
the assumed response of each firm to its rival's output. Since the Cournot solution 
is obtained by maximizing IIj with respect to Qj, assuming Q2 to be constant, 
and 112 with respect to Q2, assuming Qi to be constant, the conjectural variation 
is equal to zero, i.e., dQ2ldQ\ = 0 and dQ\ldQ2 = 0. Solving (3.4) yields Firm 
I's reaction function. 
Reaction functions express the output of each duopolist as a function of his 
rival's output. Solving the reaction functions simultaneously yields the Cournot 
solution. 
One of the more interesting sets of assumptions about conjectural variation is 
contained in the analysis of leadership and followership formulated by Stackelberg. 
Suppose we assume Firm 2 is the leader and Firm 1 is the follower. The follower. 
Firm 1, obeys his reaction function (3.6) and adjust his output level to maximize 
his profit, given the quantity decision of his rival. The leader, Firm 2, does not obey 
his reaction function. Firm 2 assumes that Firm 1 acts as a follower, and maximizes 
his profit, given Firm I's reaction function. 
Firm 2 uses Firm I's reaction function, (3.6), to determine optimal output Q2-
Substitutes (3.6) into his profit function (3.3). 
Similarly, solve (3.5) for Firm 2's reaction function. 
(3.6) 
Q2 ~~ s(^i) (3.7) 
n2 = f (<?i + Q2) ' 02 - ^2(92) (3.8) 
=  P [ f { Q 2  + Q 2 ]  " Q 2  -  ^2(^2) (3.9) 
Firm 2's profit is now a function of Q2 alone and can be maximized with respect 
to this single variable. 
§ = + «2I + <?2 • 
where df/dQ2 is the slope of Firm I's reaction function. Solving equation (3.10) 
yields Stackelberg leader output, Q2 and substituting Q2 in Firm I's reaction func­
tion (3.6) yields Firm I's follower output, Q^. 
3.2 Impacts of Thailand Export Policy on U.S. Rice Market 
Now we apply the Stackelberg duopoly model to the world rice market and are 
concerned with how a leader's price policy affects a follower's market. The analysis 
is presented in Figure 3.1. As we assumed, Thailand is a leader and U.S. is the 
follower in the world rice market. 
Thailand supply is S f .  Let EDrow be the summation of net export demands 
facing duopolists, Thailand and the U.S. The U.S. supply is Sus- Also, let us 
assume that Thailand is willing to let the fringe sell all they can at whatever price 
Thailand sets. In other words, the fringe can sell what the U.S. does not want to 
sell at the price Thailand sets. Therefore, the demand function facing Thailand is 
Df which is the horizontal subtraction of Sua from EDrow- If Thailand wants to 
maximize  na t iona l  re tu rns  i t  equa tes  the  marg ina l  revenue  (MRF)  to  supply  {ST)  
to determine the optimal output Qf. Thailand charges Py] which is world price. At 
that price the U.S. sells OQua- This plus OQi{= QuaQw) satisfies world demand 
of Qw- Thailand is better off compared to the competitive situation Pc because the 
* 





Figure 3.1: Determination of Stackelberg Solution for World Rice Market 
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net loss in producer surplus (BCD) is more than offset by the net gain in monopoly 
rent PwACPq. Also, the fringe is better off selling a large quantity at a higher 
price. Consumers globally are worse off. 
If producer price is set at Pp, however, Thailand government can charge an 
export tax equal to Pw — Pp- Or a mandatory supply control program could be 
implemented to restrict supply to Qp The Thailand government uses the policy of 
a combined export tax and the quota system. 
Based on the duopoly market structure discussed above, how does the export-
oriented policy of the Thailand government affect the U.S. rice market? Since the 
early 1980s, the Thailand government has been adopting a more export-oriented 
policy and expanding its market share. Therefore, effects of cutting export taxes 
by the Thailand government on the U.S. rice market will be discussed. 
Suppose the Thailand government reduces the export tax from Pw — Pp to 
Pc — Pp by setting the export price at competitive levels. Then Thailand can 
export more, from QusQw to QusQwi and the U.S. exports, less from OQus to 
OQusi because of the lower export price. Figure 3.2 represents how reduction of 
Thailand export taxes affects the U.S. domestic market. U.S. export demand shifts 
down because Thailand occupies some portion of the U.S. export share by cutting 
its export tax. This result corresponds to a leftward shift of the market demand 
curve in Figure 3.2 from Dg to and a decrease of the farm price from Pg to 
The decrease in market price induces the incentives of the domestic consumer to 
consume and of the stock-holder to have more stocks. And the decrease in market 
price reduces the incentive of farmers to plant. 
« 
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Figure 3.2: The efTecls of Thailand export tax decrease on U.S. rice market. 
3.3 Impacts of Foreign Demand Fluctuations on U.S. Rice Market 
With a basic duopoly model as discussed in the previous section, it is straight­
forward to explore the determination of foreign demand shocks in world rice markets. 
Suppose major importing countries (see Table 2.3) had sudden increases in the to­
tal production in a given year'^, which implies sudden decreases in import demand, 
thus shifting the excess demand curve facing Thailand and the U.S., EDrow^ to 
EDlpow Figure 3.3. Assumptions and notations are the same as those described 
before. To maximize national returns, Thailand equates the new marginal revenue 
{MR^) to supply (Sf^) to determine the optimal output, QJ. Thailand charges 
which is the new world price. At that price the U.S. sells OQ^a- This plus OQJ (= 
QusQw) satisfies the new world demand of Q!^. Both Thailand and the U.S. are 
globally worse off because of the lower world price, and less exports. 
Once the quantity of U.S. export share is set at OQ^s through changes in 
prices in the world market, transmission of foreign demand shocks in the U.S. rice 
market can be analyzed. Figure 3.4 represents how reduction of foreign demand in 
the world market affects the U.S. domestic market. U.S. export demand shifts down 
because of lower export prices and less world demand. This result corresponds to 
a leftward shift of the market demand curve in Figure 3.4 from Dq to Dj and a 
decrease of farm prices from Pq to Pj. The decrease of market prices induces the 
incentives of domestic consumers to consume and of stock-holders to have more 
stocks. And the decrease of market prices reduces the incentive of farmers to plant. 
^The factors contributing heavily to the increase in production might be abnor­





QusQusQus Q^n^ ibQii; q" 
M Red 
to 00 
Figure 3.3: Graphical Representation of Foreign Demand Shocks in Duopoly 
Model 
P 
\\  \\ / / 
l\ l\ \Ey^ A 
1 1 \  
1 1 \  
1 l\ 
1 1 \ K A' \  / J \Do 
Ç *-
Domestic Stock Export Supply Logged 
Demand Demand Demand Market Stock 
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3.4 Impacts of Price Support Policy on U.S. Rice Market 
Government commodity programs in the U.S., including rice, have both direct 
and indirect effects on farmers, consumers, and taxpayers. Specifically, the rice 
program affects 1) prices received by farmers and paid by foreign consumers of 
rice, 2) incomes of farmers and taxpayers, 3) resources - specifically, land and other 
inputs used to produce rice, 4) quantity of rice demanded domestically and abroad, 
and 5) foreign production and exports of competitors. 
The mechanisms currently used to achieve objectives of the farm programs, 
among others, include nonrecourse loans, a deficiency payment scheme, and acreage 
controls. 
Nonrecourse loans are 9 to 12 month loans which the government makes avail­
able to farmers at a specified loan rate per unit of production. The farmer's crop is 
used as collateral. When the loan reaches maturity, the farmer may repay it, plus 
interest, in cash, or repay it in-kind using his crop. This program is an example of 
a 'minimum price scheme' in which the government maintains a fioor price to both 
producers and consumers by acquiring or disposing of stocks of grain. Deficiency 
payments are made to rice producers when the average market price over the first 
five months of the marketing year falls below a specified 'target price'. The payment 
per unit of production is the difference between the target price and the maximum 
of the market price and the rate at which nonrecourse loans are made available. To 
qualify for deficiency payments producers may be required to reduce their planted 
acreage from an assessed base level. Land diversion payments, in cash or in kind, 
may be received by farmers for land removed from production under this program. 
However, increasing government stocks and decreasing exports leads USD A 
« 
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to adopt more market-oriented policy by reducing support prices under the Food 
Security Act of 1985 (FSA85). Loan rates for the major program commodities have 
been dropped to minimum allowable levels, acreage reduction requirements have 
been increased, and generic payment-in-kind certificates have been used to make 
up a high proportion of government payments to farmers. Minimum target prices 
were set at $ 11.90, and $ 11.66 per cwt for the crop years 1986-1987, respectively, 
and subsequently will be reduced by 10 percent, guaranteed that gross receipts from 
crops and net farm income would remain at a nominal value comparable to that 
achieved on average during the 1981 Farm Bill. 
Lots of analysts argued that rigid price supports and unrealistically high target 
prices were simply not appropriate to the economic condition that merged in the 
1980s (Rodgers, 1985). To say, agricultural economists repeatedly argue as to what 
the appropriate forms of policy instruments, such as support levels, should be. The 
optimal setting, whatever it may be, should be defensible. This study, however, will 
not attempt to investigate such issues. In contrast, the existing agricultural policy 
instruments in the rice market, support levels, are analyzed. 
How target prices affect the rice market will be demonstrated by constructing 
an annual econometric model of the U.S. rice market. The target price affects 
other endogenous variables in the model through the planted acreage equation, 
which depends upon, among other things, expected gross returns per acre. Rice 
producing farmers are concerned with their expected returns rather than expected 
prices. This is done because when rice producing farmers make decision for planted 
acreage, they would give more attention not only to expected prices but also to 
expected production costs and expected yields. Expected gross return is determined 
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by the three-year moving average of expected net returns. Expected net returns is 
modeled as maximum (expected farm price, loan rate) times expected yield minus 
variable costs plus the deficiency payment per acre. The expected payment rate 
for the deficiency payment is modeled in this study as the difference between the 
target price and an expected price. The expected price is either a farm price prior 
to planting or the loan rate, whichever is higher. If no acreage limitation program is 
announced, the deficiency payment will act as an incentive for qualified farmers to 
produce more even though there may not be other strong market signals for them 
to do so. 
The partial analysis for the changes in target price, as opposed to general equi­
librium analysis, is represented by graphs in Figure 3.5. The decrease of target 
prices reduces the incentives of farmers to plant owing to a decrease in the expected 
gross returns. Consequently, a smaller supply of rice is expected. This result corre­
sponds to a leftward shift of the supply curve in Figure 3.5 from Sq to S-^ and an 
increase of farm prices from PFq to PFI. Given milled demand unchanged, milled 
prices increase from PMq to PM-^. Thus, quantity of milled demand exports, food 
use, and inventory decrease. 
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4 STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL 
The domestic and world economies of food and agriculture have become increas­
ing complex over the last few decades due to economic and noneconomic factors (i.e., 
domestic and foreign price instabilities, government administrative instability, infla­
tion, and trade regulation etc.). Specifically, the supply-demand price relationships 
for rice are complex because of the diverse of demand and supply characteristics of 
the rice market. Prices and uses of rice products are determined simultaneously, not 
only by the supply of rice, but also by certain factors outside the market structure 
that affect demand (Grant et al. 1984). The increasing widespread use of commod­
ity models for rice reflects not only our deeper understanding of these complexities 
of the market, but also our ability to measure the various influences which economic 
and noneconomic factors exert in the market. 
The development of useful decision-making models for dynamic systems of the 
type represented by the agriculture and food economy requires the construction 
of conditional policy forecasts. In many situations, the construction of forecasting 
frameworks will also require the development of descriptive as well as explanatory 
models^. To ascertain the effect of alternative policies in terms of performance mea-
^ Johnson and Hausser (1977) classified models in a number of ways. A particu­
larly useful classification criterion is based on model objective. Depending upon re­
search objectives, the researcher may use descriptive, explanatory, predictive and/or 
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sures, causal relationship between the decision variables and relevant performance 
measures must be captured (Hausser and Just, 1981). 
This chapter provides the conceptual framework of the model and general spec­
ifications based on the theory and knowledge of economic relationships in the U.S. 
rice industry, which is discussed in an earlier chapter. The model determines acreage 
planted, acreage harvested, yields, total production, food consumption, commercial 
exports, commercial stocks, farm price, wholesale price, retail price, export price of 
the U.S., export price of Thailand, expected returns of rice, and government costs 
for rice endogenously. 
4.1 Acreage Planted 
RCAPUS = FL[RIAALU9R,  RCERUS,  RISK,  Zj] (4.1) 
where 
RIAALU9R = Rice, Land Allotments 
RCNRUS = Rice, Expected Net Returns 
RISK = Rice, Risk Variable 
Z\ = Dummy Variables 
During the period 1955 - 1977, land allotment and marketing quotas were in ef­
fect. As allotments restrict acreage, RIAALU9R lies between 0 and 1. After 1973, 
RIAALU9R = 1 because this program did not continue. Even though the 1981 
Act repealed the rice allotment and marketing system, allotments no longer re-
decision models. 
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fleeted actual planting patterns (USDA, ERS, 1984. Rice, Background for 1985 
Farm Legislation). However, the acreage reduction program (ARP) was introduced 
as a more specific acreage control method. When in effect, the ARP requires land 
to be diverted from a farm's rice base acreage and put into approved conservation 
uses. Compliance was required for eligibility for loans and deficiency payments. So 
acreage diversion variable will be used in this equation after 1981. 
Following Langley (1983), expected gross returns which is a three-year mov­
ing average of expected net returns, instead of price variable, is introduced in the 
acreage equation. Net returns per acre at time t is 
RCNRUS = [{RCYHUS^ *MAX{RCFPUS^ ,RCLRUS) \  
-RCCOUS + RCDPRUS (4.2) 
where 
R C Y H U =  Expected Yield per Acre 
RCFPUS^ = Expected Farm Price 
RCLRUS = Announced Loan Rate 
RCCOUS = Rice, Variable Costs per Acre 
RCDPRUS = Rice, Deficiency Payments Rate 
The deficiency payment is determined by a formula: deficiency payment equals 
farm program acreage times farm program yields times payment rate. The expected 
payment rate for the deficiency payment is modeled in this study as the difference 
between the target price and an expected price. The expected price is either an 
expected farm price or the loan rate, whichever is higher. The effect of U.S. price 
support program (i.e., the target price and the loan rate) on other endogenous 
variables will be discussed through the acreage planted equation, which depends 
upon, among other things, expected net returns per acre. 
The next component in the acreage planted equation is the RISK variable. 
Some econometric acreage response investigations include a risk variable. Develop­
ments in the economics of risk have provided some analytical tools in the analysis 
of stabilization benefits (e.g., Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Pope, Chavas, and Just, 
1983). Empirical work has also addressed the influence of risk on agricultural pro­
duction and distribution. Previous empirical research indicates, presumably because 
of risk aversion, that increases in price instability or income instability tend to de­
crease aggregate supply (e.g., Just, 1974; Lin, 1977; Hurt and Garcia, 1982) and to 
increase marketing margins (e.g., Brorsen et al, 1985 ; Grant et al. 1984). Brorsen 
et al. (1987) considered the influence of risk variables in a market equilibrium 
framework using a structural econometric model of the U.S. rice industry. 
A relatively simple method to represent risk is a measure of dispersion about a 
mean level (e.g., a moving standard deviation of prices or returns). The risk variable 
in this equation is specified as the square root of a weighted moving average of the 
squared deviation of actual net returns from expected net returns. Expected net 
returns is considered to be last year's net returns. We use a three-year lag, which is 
fairly standard in acreage response studies (e.g., Just, 1974; T. Ryan, 1977). Thus, 
the measure of risk in supply is 
RISK,  =  H(RCNRUST_I  •  RCNRUST_I_IF\ \  
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where the weights selected (a^) are arbitrary ( i.e., y, ^). 
Since the inauguration of the target price program in 1976, direct payments 
have made up an increasing share of producer incomes and lowered acreage planted. 
During 1977 Government expenditures were about 128 million dollars for the direct 
price support or deficiency program. However, sharply decreasing farm and export 
prices in 1976 resulted in low acreage planted in 1977. Furthermore, the higher 
Thailand export price of rice in 1980 resulted in lower exports for Thailand and 
higher U.S. rice exports. South Korea, for example, imported more than 1-million 
metric tons from the U.S. in 1980. As a result acreage passed the 3-million mark 
for the first time in 1980 and reached a record 3.8 million in 1981. So dummy 
variables for 1977 and 1981 are adopted. Furthermore, the payment-in-kind (PIK) 
acreage reduction program in 1983 sharply reduced rice acreage by removing 1.2 
miUion acres from production. A dummy variable for 1983 was used in the acreage 
equation to reflect this policy. 
4.2 Acreage Harvested 
RCAHUS = F2[RCAPUS]  (4.3) 
Since production is equal to harvested acreage times yield, the planted acreage 
in the model must be transformed to acres harvested. 
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4.3 Yields 
RCYHUS = F:I[RCADUS,RIAALUM,RCCOUS,  
YEAR,  RAINFALL,  DUMIZ]  (4.4) 
The yields equation contains acreage diversion, land allotment, production cost, 
weather, trend, and dummy variable. Acreage diversion and land allotment vari­
ables are used in the equation to reflect the land area devoted to rice production. 
Economic theory indicates that acreage increases have negative impacts on yield due 
to limited capital and human resources in the short run and bring marginal land into 
rice production. Therefore, acreage diversion and land allotment should have posi­
tive effects. Production cost and trend variables are also included in this equation. 
It is well known that increasing production costs causes yields to decrease. Trend 
variables have a positive impact due to development of new technology. With gov­
ernment farm commodity programs, a physical factor such as weather is sometimes 
more important in determining year-to-year changes in production than economic 
forces are. Thus, a rainfall variable is included in the equation. A dummy variable 
is used for 1973 because of oil shocks. 
The production of rice is expressed as the product of area harvested times 
yields per acre. 
4.4 Total Production 
RCTPUS = RCAHUS *  RCYHUS (4.5) 
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4.5 Food Consumption 
We can specify the food demand equation from a straightforward application 
of consumer demand theory, which shows the outcome for a utility-maximizing 
consumer who faces known prices and a fixed income when making commodity 
purchase decisions (Henderson and Quandt, 1980). Demand depends on the com­
modity price, the prices of substitutes (i.e., potatoes, corn, and wheat for rice), and 
income. Hence, an individual's rice demand {RCFOUS^) is functionally related to 
rice retail price, prices of substitutes, and income: 
RCFOUSi  =  F5[RCMPUS,  MPS ,  DPI^ ]  (4.6) 
where 
RCMPUS = Rice, Retail Price 
MPS = Prices of Substitutes 
DPIi = Personal Disposable income 
Under the assumption of identical consumer tastes, market demand (RCFOUS) can 
be written in terms of population and individual demands: 
RC FOUS  =  POPUS *  F^ [RCM PUS,  M PS ,  (4.7) 
or 
PC POTT Ç 
p Q p f jg  =  F i [ROMPVS ,  MPS ,  DPI i \  (4.8) 
^This specification restricts the population elasticity at one, thereby avoiding 
multicollinearity between population and income. 
41 
where 
POPUS = Population in the U.S. 
4.6 Commercial Exports 
p n  p p j T  c  
RCCEXUS = F6[( WEGIN, WHEPUS.RCGEXUS] (4.9) 
JiG £ j . r  1  h  
where 
RCEPUS X = Rice, U.S. Export Price 
RCEPTH = Rice, Export Price of Thailand 
WEGIN = Weighted Income of Major Importing Countries 
WHEPUS = Wheat, U.S. Export Price 
RCCEXUS = Government Exports 
This equation includes relative export price, weighted income of major importing 
countries, wheat export price, and Government exports. The relative export price 
is obtained by calculating the ratio of the U.S. export price of rice with the export 
price of Thailand rice because the U.S. export price and the Thailand export price 
of rice are highly correlated in the world rice market. Each is affected by govern­
ment programs in the respective countries. The ratio of these prices was assumed 
to influence U.S. commercial exports. Weighted income growth of major importing 
countries (WEGIN) also influences the demand for U.S. commercial exports. WE­
GIN was calculated by income growth of major importing countries weighted by 
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the amount of imports. The import substitute food grains are wheat and rice in the 
world market. Wheat as well as rice is a staple food in the developing and under-
developing countries, and these countries import substantial quantities of U.S. rice. 
Thus, wheat export price of U.S., as a proxy for world price, is included in this 
equation. 
4.7 Commercial Stocks 
RCPSUS  =  FT  [R CF P US , NI R , R CSUUS,  
R CTP U Si .Z ' j ]  (4.10) 
where 
RCFPUS X = Price Received by Farmers 
NIR = Normal Interrest Rate 
RCSUUS = Target Price 
RCTPU= Rice, Total Production 
Private stocks are specified as a function of farm price, interest rate, government 
policy variable (target price), and total production. Private stocks will generally be 
negatively related to current farm price, since lower prices make it more likely one 
can sell later at a profit. That is, the higher the current price, the less likely that 
future prices will be high enough to give a capital gain on the stocks. 
Interest rate has also a negative effect on stocks. The negative coefficient for 
interest rate refiects the opportunity cost of higher interest rates in storing the crop 
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inventories. Thus, it captures the stocks effect of higher interest rates leading to a 
reduction in the crop storage. 
Total production also affects carryover stocks because some portion of increased 
production usually remains in stocks. 
Boehlje and Griffin (1979) pointed out that expected farm prices with a govern­
ment program is higher than expected farm prices without the program. Therefore, 
a higher support price announced by the U.S. Government indicates a higher future 
price. Grant et al. (1984) also pointed out that stocks are influenced by government 
programs. Thus, a target price variable is included and expected to have positive 
impact in the equation. 
Dummy variables are included to account for irregular increases in private 
stocks. After the 1973 export boom private stocks increased sharply because of 
decreasing export demand. The sharply decreasing price of rice in 1982 also influ­
enced large amounts of carryover stocks. Therefore, dummy variables are used for 
1975 to 1982 in this equation. 
4.8 Market - Clearing Identity 
R C T P U S  4- L A G { R C P S U S )  +  L A G { R C G S U S )  =  
R C F O U S  +  R C C E X U S  +  R C G E X U S  
+RCPSUS + RCGSUS + RCOTUS (4.11) 
Equilibrium in the rice market requires that the total supply of rice at time 
t is equal to total demand of rice at time t. Total supply is deflned as current 
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total production plus stocks in private and government ownership that were carried 
over from the previous marketing year. Total demand is comprised of current food 
consumption, commercial exports, government export, private stocks, government 
stocks, and other demand factors (seed use etc.). 
4.9 Farm Price 
R C F P U S  =  F Q [ R C W P U S ,  T R C ,  Z g ]  (4.12) 
where 
RCWPUS = Rice, U.S. Wholesale Price 
TRC = Transportation Cost Index, 1977=100 
ZQ = Dummy Variable 
The equation is formulated such that the farm price is directly related to the whole­
sale price. A transportation cost index for grain is included to account for marketing 
margins. 
4.10 U.S. Export Price 
R C E P U S  =  F I Q [ R C W P U S ,  M E R M ,  R C E P T H ,  Z I O ]  (4.13) 
where 
RCWPUS = Rice, Wholesale Price 
MERM = Exchange Rate, $/foreign currency 
RCEPTH = Rice, Export Price of Thailand 
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The U.S. export price is directly related to the wholesale price. Exchange rate 
($/foreign currency) also affects U.S. export price directly. We believe that the U.S. 
is the residual supplier in the world rice market while Thailand is the leader. As we 
discussed correlation between U.S. and Thailand export prices in the commercial 
export equation, Thailand export price leads to increase or decrease U.S. export 
price. After 1973 export boom U.S. export as well as world price are sharply 
increased. Therefore, dummy variables are used for 1973 to 1985 in the equation. 
4.11 Thailand Export Price 
R C E P T H  =  F l l  [ R C F P T H , E X T A X T H , L A G { R C E P T H )  
W H T P W R / P O P W R ,  I N T P M I / I N P O P M I ]  (4.14) 
where 
RCFPTH X = Thailand, Farm Price 
EXTAXTH = Thailand, Export Tax 
WHTPWR = Wheat, World Total Production 
POPWR = World Population 
INTPMI = Rice, Total Production of Major Importers 
INPOPMI = Population of Major Importing Countries 
This equation is formulated such that the export price of Thailand is directly related 
to the farm price. As mentioned before, to keep the low domestic price and to 
earn government revenue from rice exports, the Thailand government imposes an 
export tax on rice. The impact is hypothesized to be positive. There is a lag in 
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the adjustment of Thailand export price to changes in world supply conditions. 
Therefore, a partial adjustment scheme is assumed for the equation. The Thailand 
export price is also hypothesized to be determined by world wheat production per 
capita (as a substitute crop) and total rice production per capita of major importing 
countries. The more rice production of major importers, the less export demand 
facing the duopolists, Thailand and the U.S.. 
4.12 Expected Net Returns 
R C N R U S  =  [ { R C Y H U S ^  * M a x { R C F P U S ^ , R C L R U S ) ]  
- R C C O U S  +  M a a : [ 0 ,  { [ R C S U U S  
-Max{RCFPUS, RCLRUS)) * RCYHPA)] (4.15) 
4.13 Expected Gross Returns 
R C E R U S { t )  =  [ R C N R U S { t - l )  +  R C N R U S { t - 2 )  +  R C N R U S { t - ^ ) ] / Z  (4.16) 
The expected gross returns equation is defined as a three-year moving average 
of expected net returns. 
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4.14 Deficiency Payments 
R C D P U S  =  R C A P P A  *  R C Y H P A  *  [ R C S U U S  -  M a x { R C F P U S ^ , R C L R U S ) ]  
(4.17) 
where 
RCAPPA = Rice, Farm Program Acreage 
RCYHPA = Rice, Farm Program Yields 
The deficiency payment is determined by farm program acreage times farm program 
yield times payment rate. The expected payment rate for the deficiency payment 
is modeled as the difference between the target price and an expected price. The 
expected price is either an expected farm price or the loan rate, whichever is higher. 
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5 ESTIMATION OF THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the estimation techniques appropri­
ate for the specification of the systematic component of the structure are discussed. 
Secondly, the definitions and sources of the data used for the analysis are described. 
The estimated results of the model developed in the previous chapter are also pre­
sented. Finally, conclusions are presented in the last section. 
5.1 Estimation Techniques 
Consider the following equation system which is presented in matrix form.: 
A Y  =  B X ^ U  
where 
Y = matrix of endogenous variables 
X = matrix of predetermined variables 
A = matrix of coefficients on endogenous variables 
B = matrix of coefficients on predetermined variables 
U = matrix of residuals 
If matrix A can be expressed as a (block) triangular matrix, then the system of 
equations is called a (block-) recursive equation system. If matrix A can be ex­
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pressed as a diagonal or block diagonal matrix, then the system is considered as a 
seemingly unrelated equation system. If matrix A cannot be expressed in either of 
the forms mentioned above, then the system is a simultaneous equation system. 
In a recursive equation system, each of the endogenous variables can be deter­
mined sequentially, while a block-recursive equation system is a group of equations 
which can be broken up into groups or blocks of equations in such a way that groups 
of equations across blocks are recursive. A seemingly unrelated equation system is a 
specific type of recursive model which consists of a series of equations linked because 
the error terms across equations are correlated. A simultaneous equation system 
is a completely interdependent system in which any endogenous variable cannot be 
solved without simultaneously solving all equations. 
If the disturbance terms across equations in a recursive system or a seemingly 
unrelated system are not correlated, ordinary least squares (OLS) would be a con­
sistent and asymtotically efficient estimator applied in estimation. However, when 
the error terms are correlated across equations, the application of OLS would be 
inappropriate, and the efficiency of the parameter estimates could be improved us­
ing a more sophisticated estimation technique developed by Zellner. This technique 
is called seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), joint generalized least squares, or 
Zellner's method. 
Zellner suggests that efficiency in estimation can be gained if one views the 
system of seemingly unrelated equations as a single large equation to be estimated. 
Estimation of this single system equation is accomplished efficiently through the use 
of generalized least squares estimation. SUR achieves an improvement in efficiency 
over OLS by taking into explicit account the fact that error terms across equations 
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may not be zero. 
In a simultaneous equation system, OLS estimation will generally yield biased 
and inconsistent parameter estimates. This is because the equations in the simul­
taneous system are interdependent such that some dependent variables from other 
equations appear as regressors in a certain equation. As a result, the endogenous 
variables which appear as regressors in a certain equation are correlated with the 
disturbance term of the equation; while OLS estimates will be consistent only if all 
the independent variables in a certain equation are uncorrelated with the distur­
bance term. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
are two popular estimating techniques applied to estimate a simultaneous equation 
system. 2SLS is a single-equation method, while 3SLS is a system method. 
2SLS and 3SLS estimations can solve the problem of correlation of the dis­
turbance term in a certain equation with the endogenous variables appearing as 
regressors in that equation and can thereby yield consistent estimates. However, 
if correlation exists among disturbances across equations, the 3SLS estimator is 
more efficient than the 2SLS estimator. This is because 3SLS involves the appli­
cation of generalized least squares estimation to the system of equations, each of 
which has first been estimated using 2SLS, and takes into account cross-equation 
correlation. In the first stage of 3SLS, the reduced form of the equation system 
is estimated through OLS. The fitted values of the endogenous variables are then 
used to get 2SLS estimates of all the equations in the system. Once the 2SLS pa­
rameters have been calculated, the residuals of each equation are used to estimate 
the cross-equation variances and covariances. In the third stage, generalized least 
squares parameter estimates are obtained. 
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However, nonlinearities often enter economic models in various forms. In gen­
eral, fundamental identities, as well as many other basic variables (e.g., relative 
prices), form ratios that render the model nonlinear. Moreover, a simultaneous 
equations system with autocorrelated error terms can lead to a nonlinear system 
(see Judge et al., 1982). Several attempts were made, with little or no success, to 
correct for the autocorrelation. Since the model was estimated by using a nonlin­
ear estimation program, correction for the autocorrelation involved huge amounts 
of computer cost and also produced unsatisfactory results. In recognition of these 
problems, the original estimates are used for the analysis. The mathematical struc­
ture of the model presented in Chapter 4 is nonUnear. In view of the nonlinearity 
nature of the model, nonlinear three-stage least squares (N3SLS) was used for the 
final estimation of the model. The computer program used for the estimation is 
SYSNLIN of SAS/ETS (SAS, 1985). 
N3SLS estimation procedure is a straightforward generalization of the linear 
three-stage least squares estimator. Gallant (1977) describes the simultaneous sys­
tem consisting of M nonlinear equations as 
~ ^ati o = Ij2,• • •,il/, f = 1,2,• • • ,n.. 
where y  is an M  by 1 vector of endogenous variables, a; is a A by 1 vector of 
exogenous variables, 6^ is a fq, by 1 vector of unknown parameters contained in 
the compact parameter space Ha^ and 
^at = 
is the t M  by 1 vector of residuals for the M  endogenous variables stacked together. 
The N3SLS estimates the parameters by minimizing the generalized sum of squares 
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of the residuals. 
Gallant shows, if the following assumptions are satisfied and each equation in 
the model is identified, the N3SLS estimator is strongly consistent, asymptotically 
normally distributed, and more efficient than the nonlinear two-stage least squares 
estimator (N2SLS). 
The assumptions are: 
1) The moment matrix of the instrumental variables { ^ ) Z  Z  converges to a 
positive definite matrix P; where Z is a t by 1 vector of instrumental variables. 
2) The errors are independently and identically distributed each having 
mean zero and positive definite variance-covariance matrix S. 
3) Each parameter space Ha is compact. 
4) The true parameter value 6^ is contained in an open sphere Oa which is, 
in turn, contained in Ha-
5) Each function qaiVi^i^a) and its first and second order derivatives with 
respect to 6a are continuous in Ba for fixed (y,®). 
The identification rule is defined as: 
The structural equation 
qa{yt,3H,9a) = eat 
from a system satisfying the above assumption is said to be identified by the instru­
ments Zf if the only solution of the almost sure limit 
f = 1  
is 6a = 6a-
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A rigorous treatment of the assumptions, identification, efficiency tests, and 
estimation of N3SLS procedure can be found in Gallant (1977). 
Before the final estimates were obtained by using N3SLS, considerable time was 
spent in estimating the model by using ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), and nonlinear two-stage least squares (N2SLS). OLS was applied 
to each behavioral equation of the model to check the a priori expected signs of 
the variables in each equation, to test the goodness of fit of each equation, and to 
identify any misspecification of the variables. 
Considering the simultaneous nature of the model, the next step was to use 
system method for the estimation. First, 2SLS was used to estimate the supply 
sector and the demand sector as two separate blocks to see how these two sectors 
perform individually. Then, both blocks were combined together as a single system 
and estimated by 2SLS. A comparison of 2SLS estimates with that of OLS estimates 
indicated substantial differences in the levels of estimated coefficients, implying that 
simultaneous equation bias in OLS estimates is significant for the hypothesized 
system. 
Since the model is nonlinear in nature, N2SLS was also applied to the entire 
model. N2SLS assumes that endogenous variables of an equation are correlated with 
the disturbance term, but the disturbance terms across equation are not correlated, 
i.e., there is no contemporaneous correlation. Therefore, N2SLS ignores information 
that may be available concerning the error covariances. Also, the N2SLS estimator 
does not consider information concerning the endogenous variables that appear in 
the system but not in the i-th equation. Thus, the estimation of the model by 
N2SLS will yield consistent but biased estimates. 
Table 5.1. Description, unit, and data source of variables 
Variable Description Unit Source 
List of Endogenous Variables 
RCAPUS Acreage planted in U.S. 1000 acres USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
RCAIIUS Acreage harvested in U.S. ' 1000 acres USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
RCYllUS yields per acre in U.S. lbs per acre USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
RCTPUS Total production in U.S. 1000 cwt. USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
RCFOUS Domestic food 1000 cwt. USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
consumption in U.S. (various issues) 
RCCEXUS Commercial exports 1000 cwt. USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
RCPSUS Private ending stocks in U.S. 1000 cwt. USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Variable Description 
RCFPUS Price received by farmers in I 
RCWPUS Wholesale price in U.S. 
RCEPUS U.S. export price 
RCEPTH Thailand export price 
RCNRUS Net returns for rice 
RCERUS Expected gross returns 
for rice 
RCDPUS U.S. Government deficiency 
payments for rice 
Unit Source 
$ per cwt. USDA, Rice Outlook and 
Situation (various issues) 
$ per cwt. USDA, Rice Outlook and 
Situation (various issues) 
$ per cwt. USDA, Rice Outlook and 
Situation (various issues) 
US $ per cwt. USDA, Rice Outlook and 
Situation (various issues) 
$ per acre Calculated based on season average 
price, yield, and variable cost 
$ per acre Calculated based on net 
returns for rice 
(3-year moving average) 
million dollars USDA, ASCS Commodity Fact 
Sheets for rice (various issues) 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Variable Description 
List of exogenous Variables 
R1AALU9R Land allotment/maximum acres 
planted 
RISK Risk variable is specified as the 
square root of a weighted moving 
average of the squared deviation 
of actual net return from expected 
net returns (see Langley, 1983) 
RCADPA Participant acreage diversion 
RCCOUS Rice, variable costs of 
production 
DUM77 Dummy variable to represent the 
inauguration of the target price 
program in 1977 
DUM81 Dummy variable to represent the 
foreign demand shock in 1980 
Unit Source 
index, 1974=1 USDA, ASCS Commodity fact 
Sheets for rice (various issues) 
$ per acre Calculated based on farmers' 
net returns per acre 
acres USDA, ASCS Commodity fact 
Sheets for rice (various issues) 
$ per acre USDA, Economic Indicators of the 




1981 = 1 
other years=0 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Variable Description 
DIJM83 Dummy variable to represent the 
PlK(payment-in-kind) program in 
YEAR Year 
DUM73 Dummy variable to reflect the 
production costs increase in 1973 
POPUS U.S. total population 
CPI Consumer price index 
SHIFT73 Dummy variables to reflect 
WEGIN Weighted income of major 
importing countries 
RCGEXUS llice, U.S. Government exports 






numbers Council of Economic 
Advisers, Economic Report of 
the President, 1986 
index, 1972=100 U.S. Bureau of the Census, The 
Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 
years > 1973 = 1 
other years=0 
million dollars Calculated 
1000 cwt. USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
$ per cwt. USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Variable Description 
SIIIFTTS Dummy variable to reflect the export 
demand decrease since 1974 
DU M82 Dummy variable 
RCLRUS Rice, loan rate 
TRC Railroad freight rates index 
for grain 
RCGSUS Rice, U.S. Government ending 
stocks 
RCOTUS Other domestic demand (i.e., seed, 
industry use etc.) 
MERM Effective exchange rate 
(IMF weight) 
EXTAXTH Thailand export tax 
Unit 








dollar per foreign 
currency, 1980=100, 
yearly average 
USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
USDA, Agricultural Statistics 
(various issues) 
Calculated from the market-
clearing identity 
Wharton Econometrics 
$ per cwt. Quarterly Bulletin of 
Statistics, Thailand Government 
Publication (various issues) 
Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Variable Description Unit Source 
WHTPWR Wheat, world total production 
POPWR World total population 
INTPMI Rice, total production of major 
importing countries (i.e., Nigeria, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Korea, Saudi Arab) 
INPOPMI Total population of major importing 
countries 
RCAPPA Rice, U.S. farm program acreage 





FAO, Production Yearbook 
(various issues) 
FAO, Production Yearbook 
(various issues) 
FAO, Production Yearbook 
(various issues) 
FAO, Production Yearbook 
(various issues) 
acres USDA, ASCS Commodity Fact 
Sheets for rice (various issues) 
lbs per acre USDA, ASCS Commodity Fact 
Sheets for rice (various issues) 
ADJUST Adjustment term million dollars Calculated from deficiency 
payment identity 
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N3SLS takes explicit account of the covariance matrix including the contempo­
raneous correlation of error terms across equations. Hence, N3SLS is called the full 
information method, and N3SLS estimates are consistent and asymtotically more 
efficient than N2SLS estimates. Therefore, N3SLS was preferred over N2SLS for the 
final estimation of the model. Table 5.1 contains the variable names, descriptions, 
and data sources. The data period used for estimation is from 1960 to 1985. 
5.2 Estimated Model 
Because of the space limitation, models estimated by using OLS, 2SLS, and 
N2SLS are not reported. Only the final form of the model that is estimated by 
N3SLS is shown in Table 5.2. The model consists of 14 equations including 9 behav­
ioral relationships and 5 identities. Each equation has the estimated coefficients^. 
Since the N3SLS estimates of the parameters of the model are consistent, asym­
totically efficient, and have approximately a normal distribution, the t-test can be 
used for approximate statistical inference concerning the estimated coefficients of 
the equations. The t-values associated with each estimated coefficient are shown 
in the parentheses under each estimate. The elasticities for the related variables 
are given in brackets below the t-statistics. Coefficient of determination (i2^) and 
Durbin-Watson statistic (D-W) are presented as well, where appropriate. The re­
sults indicate all signs associated with the coefficients agree with a priori expec­
tations and most of estimated parameters are significantly different from zero at 
^ As is usually the case in empirical analysis, some of the a priori specifications 
established in the theoretical model were abandoned; some variables were dropped 
and others added. The changes made in the theoretical model for the estimation 




the 1-percent level. The final results of the structural equation estimation could be 
used for the simulation experiments. 
The supply section includes planted acreage, harvested acreage, yields per acre, 
and total production. Planted acreage response (equation 5.1) is hypothesized to be 
positively related to expected gross returns per acre from rice production, positively 
related to the land allotment, and negatively related to the risk. All parameters 
are statistically significant at the 1-percent level, while the expected gross returns 
is at the 5-percent level. The estimated elasticity of acreage planted with respect 
to expected gross returns is 0.11. That is, a 0.11-percent change in acreage is 
associated with a 1-percent change in expected gross returns in the same direction. 
Most of the previous studies use price (expectations), instead of expected returns 
concept, to see the acreage response. However, this elasticity is very close to the 
elasticities obtained by other studies (e.g., 0.125, Grant et al. (1984); 0.12, USDA, 
ERS (1984); 0.15, Langley (1983)). The estimated elasticity of acreage planted 
with respect to risk of returns is -0.06. That is, a 0.06-percent change in acreage is 
associated with a 1-percent change in risk of farm returns in the opposite direction. 
It is slightly higher than the elasticities obtained by Brosen et al. (1987), -0.026^. 
Acreage harvested (equation 5.2) is expressed as a linear function of acreage 
planted, and result indicates that almost all planted rice acreage is harvested. 
The coefficients associated with the acreage diversion and trend have the hy­
pothesized positive effect on yields (equation 5.3), and variable production costs 
have the expected negative impact. Attempts were made to include the deflated 
^It is average of acreage response elasticities (of five major rice producing States) 




lagged farm price, weather index, and lagged yields but the coefficients' signs were 
incorrect and not statistically significant^. The recent study indicated no direct 
effect on yield by price changes, although the acreage changes in response to price 
changes did affect yields (see Grant et al., 1980). This study also found that yield 
was not appreciably affected by lagged deflated farm price. The estimated elastic­
ity of yield with respect to the variable production costs is -0.14. That indicates 
that the variable production costs rather than lagged farm price influences yields 
per acre. Trend variable is involved and has a positive impact in the equation. It 
implies that development of new technology occurs over time. 
Total demand is the sum of domestic food, exports (private and government), 
stocks (private and government), and other domestic uses (e.g., seed use, industrial 
use, etc.). Domestic food consumption, private exports, and private stocks are 
endogenously determined. Economic theory suggests that food demand for rice is 
influenced by the price of rice among others, and vice versa. Therefore, 
R C F O U S / P O P U S  =  W P Q l  - h  W P Q 2  *  { R C W P U S / C P I )  
we can convert the food consumption per capita function to a market price function 
to get around the structural problem in a simultaneous equation system. The 
market wholesale price equation is solved from the food consumption equation and 
food consumption is solved from a market clearing condition. Therefore, 
R C W P U S  =  W P O l  *  C P I  +  W P 0 2  *  { { R C F O U S  *  C P I ) / P O P U S )  
^Since there was no single aggregate variable to represent the weather condi­
tions across the country, the variable pasture condition was used for the weather 
index. However, it produced unsatisfactory results and, hence, was dropped from 
the equation. 
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Table 5.2; The estimated structural model 
Supply Section 
Acreage planted 
RCAPUS = 2741.17 » RIAALU9R + 1.40 * RCERUS - 520.33 * RISK 
(19.63) (2.07) (-3.32) 
[0.11] [-0.06] 
- 695.00 * DUM77 + 879.67 * DUM81 - 891.63 * DUM83 
(-5.43) (6.34) (-7.74) 
= 0.92, DW = 1.98 (5.1) 
Acreage harvested 
RCAHUS = 33.76 -t- 0.99 * RCAPUS 
(0.59) (42.36) 
= 0.98, DW = 1.11 (5.2) 
Yields per acre 
RCYHUS = - 98220.92 + 0.05 * RCADPA - 4.02 * RCCOUS 
(-3.18) (0.79) (-1.64) 
[-0.14] 
-I- 52.37 * YEAR - 324.32 * DUM73 
(3.31) (-2.27) 
4- 541.54 * DUM85 
(3.46) 
R"^ = 0.77, DW = 1.62 (5.3) 
Total production 
RCTPUS = RCAHUS * RCYHUS (5.4) 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Demand Section 
Domestic food consumption 
RCWPUS = (0.23 - 0.001 * (RCFOUS/POPUS))* CPI 
(5.52) (-4.10) 
[-2.96] 
+ 8.11 * SHIFT73 
(3.18) 
= 0.40, DW = 0.78 (5.5) 
Commercial exports 
RCCEXUS = 97569.5 - 70053.2 * (RCEPUS/RCEPTH) 
(9.76) (-5.80) 
[-2.17] 
571.1 * WEGIN - 1.03 * RCGEXUS 
(7.91) (-6.56) 
[1.36] [-0.6] 
= 0.90, DW = 1.45 (5.6) 
Private stocks 
RCPSUS = - 818.37 * RCFPUS -t- 0.10 * RCTPUS -f- 832 * 
(-3.67) (3.86) (1.96) 
[-0.40] [0.40] 
RCSUUS -f 9803.34 * SHIFT75 4- 15912.19 * DUM82 
(5.37) (7.10) 
= 0.91, DW = 2.43 (5.7) 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Price Linkages 
Price received by farmers 
RCFPUS = 0.82 + 0.44 * RCWPUS - 0.005 * TRC 
(2.97) (26.0) (-2.64) 
[0.95] [-0.07] 
B? = 0.97, DW = 2.02 (5.8) 
U.S. export price 
RCEPUS = - 9.18 -f- 0.55 * RCWPUS -t- 0.06 * MERM 
(-6.13) (6.87) (5.58) 
[0.58] 
+ 0.54 * RCEPTH + 2.45 * SHIFT73 
(6.11) (6.93) 
[0.75] 
B ?  =  0.99, DW = 2.03 (5.9) 
Thailand export price 
RCEPTH = - 7.50 + 0.93 * EXTAXTH + 0.13 * LAG (RCEPTH) 
(-2.01) (21.2) (2.95) 
[0.69] 




= 0.98, DW = 1.90 (5.10) 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
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Identities 
Market - clearing identity 
RCTPUS + LAG (RCPSUS) - LAG (RCGSUS) 
= RCFOUS + RCCEXUS 4- RCGEXUS 
+RCPSUS + RCGSUS + RCOTUS (5.11) 
Expected net returns 
RCNRUS = RCYHUS * Max (RCFPUS, RCLRUS) 
- RCCOUS + Max (0, ( (RCSUUS - Max (RCFPUS, 
RCLRUS)) * RCYHPA)) (5.12) 
Expected gross returns 
RCERUS (t) = [RCNRUS (t-1) + RCNRUS (t-2) 
+ RCNRUS (t-3)l/3 (5.13) 
Government deficiency payments 
RCDPUS = RCAPPA * RCYHPA * Max (0, (RCSUUS -
Max (RCFPUS, RCLRUS)) + ADJUST (5.14) 
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The estimated parameters are shown in Table 5.2 (equation 5.5). All param­
eters are statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The relationship between 
wholesale market price and food consumption agrees with a priori expectations. 
Prices of competing commodities (e.g., potatoes, corn, and wheat) were evaluated 
by Grant and Leath (1979). But, these competing products were not found to have 
any appreciable effect on food rice consumption. Also USDA researchers (USDA, 
ERS, 1984) suggested that changes in prices of potatoes, corn, and wheat prod­
ucts, as competing commodities, have been estimated to have almost no effect on 
rice demand. Attempts were made to regress the per capita rice consumption on 
deflated wholesale prices of rice and per capita real income, but the equation was 
less preferable than this equation. So, the deflated wholesale price of rice is the ma­
jor variable affecting food rice consumption in this equation. The elasticity of the 
wholesale price with respect to per capita domestic food demand is -2.96^. There­
fore, the elasticity of per capita domestic food demand with respect to the wholesale 
price is -0.34®. That is, a 0.34-percent change in per capita food demand for rice is 
associated with a 1-percent change in the opposite direction in the wholesale price. 
Several researchers have estimated the elasticity of total U.S. domestic demand with 
respect to farm price for various time periods as: -0.07 for 1975, Grant and Leath 
(1979); -0.04 for 1955-1957, Brandow (1961); -0.18 for 1982, Grant, Beach, and Lin 
''Since equation (5.5) is the price dependent function, it is price flexibility, not 
elasticity. 
®When equation (5.5) was converted to quantity dependent function such as 
RCFOUS/POPUS = F [ RCWPUS/CPI, SHIFT73], and estimated by OLS, the 
elasticity was -0.17 which is lower elasticity than that from equation (5.5). It implies 





(1984); -0.1, USDA-ERS (1984). All these estimates of demand elasticity are rel­
atively low (inelastic), i.e., price changes have little impact on quantity demanded 
for food. All researchers above calculated elasticities for a specific time point, i.e., 
short-run elasticities. Note that the wholesale price and not retail price is used 
because of lack of data. So, the flexibility should be interpreted carefully. Also, 
since the retail price is not used, strictly speaking, equation (5.5) is not a consumer 
demand function. 
Commercial exports demand (equation 5.6) was significantly influenced by the 
ratio of U.S.-Thailand export prices, weighted income growth of major importing 
countries (WEGIN), and the quantity exported under U.S. Government programs. 
The U.S. export price (RCEPUS) and the Thailand export price (RCEPTH) are 
highly correlated. However, each is affected by government programs in the respec­
tive countries. Government intervention variables are explained next in the export 
price equations. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 
The relative export price and government exports have the expected negative im­
pact on U.S. commercial exports, and the weighted income growth of importing 
countries has the hypothesized positive impact. The estimated elasticity of U.S. 
commercial exports with respect to the relative U.S. export price is -2.17, and the 
estimated elasticity of U.S. commercial exports with respect to the income growth 
of major importing countries is 1.36. The cross-elasticity of U.S. commercial ex­
ports to U.S. Government exports is -0.6. Results indicate that the export price 
elasticity of U.S. commercial exports is relatively higher (elastic) than the elastic­
ities obtained by other studies (e.g., -0.68, Grant, Beach, and Lin (1984); -1.56, 




this result is relatively lower (inelastic) than the export elasticity with respect to 
U.S. farm price at -4.45 obtained by G tant and Leath (1979). Moreover, the result 
is also lower than the elasticity for total exports (-3.16) obtained by Grant et al. 
(1984), which implies that the U.S. Government exports are more responsive to 
price changes than the commercial exports. The cross-elasticity of U.S. commercial 
exports to U.S. Government exports was -0.6. That is, the degree of substitution of 
P.L.480 rice for commercial sales is relatively low. Differentiated markets, quantity 
of product demand, and credit terms limit substitution between these markets. 
Private stocks (equation 5.7) was significantly influenced by the farm price, 
total production, and government support price (target price). The estimated pa­
rameters have expected signs and also statistically significant at the 1-percent level. 
The estimated elasticities of private stocks with respect to the farm price and target 
price are -0.40 and 0.40 respectively. It indicates that a 1-percent change in the farm 
price is associated with 0.40-percent change in private stocks in the opposite direc­
tion, and a 1-percent change in target price is associated with 0.40-percent change in 
private stocks in the same direction. The farm price and target price affect private 
stocks with the same degree but with different direction. Attempts were made to 
include interest rates, expected total production in the next year, and lagged stocks 
but the coefficients signs were incorrect and not statistically significant. 
Wholesale prices have the expected positive impact on farm price and trans­
portation costs have the expected negative impact (equation 5.8). All parameters 
are statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The estimated elasticities of the 
wholesale price with the farm price and to transportation costs are 0.95 and -0.07 




with approximately a 1-percent change in the wholesale price in the same direction. 
The transportation costs index accounting for marketing margins affected whole­
sale price movement in the same direction, but did not have significant influences 
because of very inelastic (i.e., -0.07). 
U.S. export price (equation 5.9) is affected positively by wholesale price, ef­
fective exchange rates, and export price of Thailand. The estimated coefficients 
associated with all explanatory variables agree with a priori expectations, and are 
statistically significant at a 1-percent level. The estimated elasticities of the export 
price with respect to the wholesale price and Thailand export price are 0.58 and 
0.75 respectively. That indicates that a 1-percent change in the wholesale price 
is associated with 0.58-percent change in U.S. export price in the same direction, 
and a 1-percent change in the Thailand export price is associated with 0.75-percent 
change in the U.S. export price in the same direction. It implies U.S. export price 
is more sensitive to a change in Thailand price than in domestic price. The U.S. 
export price is also positively affected by the weighted exchange rate (MERM). 
• The Thailand export tax was assumed to be directly related to the Thailand 
export price (equation 5.10). The Thailand export prices were also affected by world 
wheat production per capita, total rice production of major importing countries, 
and lagged Thailand export price for a partial adjustment scheme. Signs of all 
estimated coefficients agree with expectations and are statistically significant under 
a 5-percent level except the coefficient of total rice production of major importing 
countries. Elasticities of the Thailand export price with respect to the export tax, 
world wheat production per capita, and total rice production of major importing 




Planted acreage is mainly influenced by U.S. Government programs (i.e., land 
allotment and price support). Target price is modelled to affect rice farmers through 
the planted acreage equation and private stocks equation. Stable price also affects 
farmers to produce more rice. Acreage diversion scheme and variable costs of rice 
production are also important variables influencing domestic rice supply through 
the yields equation. However, elasticities of U.S. rice supply with respect to these 
important explanatory variables are relatively lower than elasticities in the demand 
side. It indicates U.S. rice supply is relatively stable compared to domestic demand 
or foreign demand. 
An area of concern deals with the elasticity of demand for U.S. food (-0.34), 
which is relatively higher than that from the previous studies. The high food de­
mand elasticity may be due to a shift in ethnic populations since the seventies 
rather than in whole U.S. populations. Moreover, because we converted the food 
consumption per capita function to the wholesale price function to get around the 
structural problem for estimating a simultaneous equation system, calculated de­
mand elasticity was inverse of the price flexibility. However, in general, elasticity is 
not inverse of the flexibility unless there is no cross price effects. 
Another area of concern deals with the high elasticity of demand for U.S. 
commercial exports (-2.17). But this elasticity is lower than that for world total 
exports (-3.16) obtained by Grant et al. (1984). Most of the previous studies did 
not care about endogenizing Thailand export price and hence elasticities estimated 
by them may be biased. 
Finally, cross-price elasticity of U.S. export price with respect to Thailand 
4 Ê  
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export price is very reasonable (0.75), and elasticities of Thailand export price with 
respect to Thailand export tax and world demand shifts are also reasonable. Hence, 
the demand shocks from outside can be analyzed well through the Thailand export 
price equation. Another important point to note is that all the estimated coefficients 
of the variables involved in the model have the right signs and most of them are 
statistically significant at a 1-percent level. 
6 MODEL VALIDATION 
In this chapter, the overall ability of the model to replicate the observed values 
of the endogenous variables and the stability of the model will be tested by using 
various test criteria. 
The performance of the model can be evaluated by its ability to reproduce the 
actual data in an ex-post simulation, the validity of its estimates, and its stability. 
Since the model is to be used for multiplier and dynamic simulation analysis, a 
rigorous validation procedure is undertaken. 
After the model is estimated, the equations are examined, on a one-by-one 
basis, regarding the theoretical reasonableness as well as the statistical significance 
of each equation's coefficients and overall fit. Then a historical simulation over the 
estimated period is performed, given the historical series for the exogenous variables 
and the initial values for the endogenous variables. How closely each endogenous 
variable tracks its corresponding historical data series is then examined to evaluate 
the performance of the model. 
The simulation procedure is dynamic in the sense that solved values are used 
for lagged values of endogenous variables rather than the actual values for those 
variables. A dynamic simulation seems preferable since it allows the researcher to 
study the evolutionary charactor of the model over time. As the model is nonlinear, 
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a nonlinear simulation procedure, SIMNLIN from SAS/ETS(SAS, 1985), is used to 
solve the model. The Gauss-Seidel solution method is used for the validation run 
and all future simulation. 
Before presenting the simulation results, several goodness of fit criteria that are 
often used in evaluating individual equations within a model are discussed. Though 
none is perfect, the criteria can increase subjective confidence in the model and help 
evaluate changes in the model. The measures used to assist the evaluation for each 
equation are following^. 
6.1 Test Criteria 
6.1.1 Root Mean Square Simulation Error (RMSE) 
The measure that is most often used is called the RMSE (root-mean-square 
simulation error). The RMSE for the variable is defined as 
= simulated value of 
Y^ = actual value 
T = number of periods in the simulation 
In simple terms, the RMSE is a measure of the deviation of the simulated variable 
from its actual time path. Of course, the magnitude of this error can be evaluated 
only by comparing it with the average size of the variable in question. 
^See Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981) for further details on evaluating the simula­
tion model. 
R M S E  (6.1) 
where 
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6.1.2 Root Mean Square Percent Error (RMSPE) 
This is also a measure of the deviation of the simulated variable from its actual 
time path but in percentage terms. Thus, RMSPE is defined as 
R M S P E  =  
- y « x 2  1 f J Y F  - Y J  (6.2) 
' )  
6.1.3 Mean (Simulation) Error and Mean Percent Error 
Other measures are the mean simulation error (ME), defined as 
(Yi - r,"") (6,3) 
< = 1 
and the mean percent error (MPE), defined as 
1 T  yj _ ya 
MPE J-pg-L (6.4) 
^ t=l U 
However, the problem with mean (percent) errors is that they may be close to 0 
if large positive errors cancel out large negative errors. Therefore, the RMSE (or 
RMSPE) would be better measures of the simulation performance^. 
6.1.4 Turning Point Method 
Low root-mean-square simulation errors are only one of the desirable measures 
of simulation fit. Another important criterion is how well the model simulates 
turning points in the historical data. Even if a model could fit well with smaller 
^Mean absolute errors (and mean absolute percent errors) can also be calcu­
lated to avoid the problem of positive and negative errors canceling. However, 
RMSE(RMSPE) are used more often in practice since they penalize large individ­
ual errors more heavily. 
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RMSE, it is possible not to be able to predict or explain the fluctuation in the 
endogenous variables because of failing to predict turning points in the system or 
only predicting them with a lag. Therefore, the ability of a simulation model to 
duplicate turning points or rapid changes in the actual data is an important criterion 
for model evaluation 
6.1.5 Theil's Inequality Coefflcient (U) 
A useful simulation statistic related to the RMSE and applied to the evaluation 
of historical simulations is Theil's inequality coefficient, defined as 
Note that the numerator of U is just the RMSE, but the scaling of the denominator 
is such that U will always fall between 0 and 1. If U=0, for all t and 
there is a perfect fit. If U=l, on the other hand, the predictive performance of the 
model is as bad as it possibly could be. When U=l, simulated values are always 
0 when actual values are nonzero, or nonzero predictions have been made when 
actual values are zero and hence easy to predict, or simulated values are positive 
(negative) when actual values are negative (positive). 
The Theil's inequality coefficient can be decomposed into three different com­
ponents: , and . These proportions can be derived with little algebra 
— (F*® - F®)^ + {(Ts — aa)^ 4- 2(1 -/>)cra<ra (6,6) 
U  (6.5) 
in that 
where Y^, Y^, 0*3, and aa are the means and standard deviations of the series 
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and Y^, respectively, and p is their correlation coefficient^. We can define the 
proportions of inequality as 
- (i/:r) i:(yf _ yf)2 (*'?) 
T J S  _  -  O - G ) ^  ,  
(i/sT) zcr/ -- yff ( ' ) 
U C  _ 2 { L - P ) ( 7 3 ( R A  , 
- u/r)!:;}? -yf)2 
The proportions, , and are called the bias, the variance, and the 
covariance proportions, respectively, and they are useful as a means of breaking the 
simulation error down into its characteristic sources^. 
The bias proportion is an indication of systematic error, since it measures 
the extent to which the average values of the simulated and actual series deviate 
from each other. For better prediction of the actual values, should be close 
to zero. The variance proportion indicates the ability of the model to replicate 
the degree of variability in the variable of interest. If is large, it means that 
the actual series has fluctuated considerably while the simulated series shows little 
fluctuation, or vice versa. Finally, the covariance proportion measures what we 
might call unsystematic error; i.e., it represents the remaining error after deviations 
from average values and average variabilities have been accounted for. The perfect 
correlation of simulation values with actual values would imply the ideal distribution 
of inequality over the three sources as =0, and =1. 
3That is, p = {l/a.crjr) ^ {Yt' - Y'){Yt'' - F") (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981). 
''From equation (6.6), = I. 
6.2 Results of the Model Validation 
The overall goodness of fit of the model is evaluated by the RMSE, RMSPE, 
Theil's inequality coefficient, and the ability of the model to predict the turning 
points. In this study, the model performs very well in tracking the observed values. 
Table 6.1 presents RMSE and RMSPE for all endogenous variables. Table 6.2 
reports Theil's forecast statistics for these endogenous variables. The observed and 
predicted values for all endogenous variables are plotted in Figures 6.1 - 6.14. 
Most of the endogenous variables had very low RMSPE, except for government 
deficiency payments, which would imply the simulated values track the actual values 
fairly closely. The high RMSPE for government deficiency payments variable is due 
to its relatively big fluctuations compared to their small (most even zero) values 
over the period studied. 
Theil's forecast error measures complement the RMSE and RMSPE in explain­
ing the predictability of a simulation model. The value of bias for all the endogenous 
variables are close to zero except for the expected gross returns variable. The value 
of the regression for the expected gross returns variable is quiet small, which re­
sulted in a better prediction of the actual value (i.e., see Figure 6.13). As can be 
seen from Table 6.2, the value of Theil's inequality coefficient for all the endogenous 
variables are close to zero, implying the model has performed remarkably well in 
simulating the actual values. 
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Table 6.1: Root mean square error (RMSE) and root mean square 
percentage error (RMSPE) from the dynamic simulation 
Variable RMSE RMSPE 
Acreage planted (RCAPUS) 178.19 0.060 
Acreage harvested (RCAHUS) 182.84 0.065 
Yields per acre (RCYHUS) 145.68 0.032 
Total production (RCTPUS) 7360.54 0.057 
Domestic food consumption (RCFOUS) 6674.68 0.242 
Commercial exports (RCCEXUS) 6616.19 0.180 
Private stocks (RCPSUS) 3638.76 0.214 
Farm price (RCFPUS) 0.96 0.106 
Wholesale price (RCWPUS) 1.88 0.091 
U.S. export price (RCEPUS) 1.22 0.076 
Thailand export price (RCEPTH) 0.79 0.079 
Expected net returns (RCNRUS) 35.23 0.141 
Expected gross returns (RCERUS) 14.97 0.065 
Government deficiency payments (RCDPUS) 33.87 100805.00 
Table 6.2. Theil's forecast error measures from the dynamic simulation 
MSË decomposition 
Bias Regression Disturbance Accuracy 
Variable U 
Acreage planted (RCAPUS) 0.010 0.061 0.928 0.0348 
Acreage harvested (RCAHUS) 0.010 0.039 0.952 0.0357 
Yields per acre (RCYHUS) 0.005 0.015 0.980 0.0158 
Total production (RCTPUS) 0.021 0.076 0.902 0.0310 
Domestic food consumption (RCFOUS) 0.035 0.252 0.713 0.1067 
Conunercial exports (RCCEXUS) 0.008 0.071 0.921 0.0661 
Private stocks (RCPSUS) 0.002 0.066 0.932 0.0893 
Farm price (RCFPUS) 0.015 0.158 0.828 0.0574 
Wholesale price (RCWPUS) 0.014 0.123 0.863 0.0513 
U.S. export price (RCEPUS) 0.006 0.198 0.796 0.0338 
Thailand export price (RCEPTH) 0.017 0.054 0.928 0.0267 
Table C.2 (Continued) 
Bias 
Variable 
Expected net returns (RCNRUS) 0.034 
Expected gross returns (RCERUS) 0.338 
Government deficiency payments 0.041 
(RCDPUS) 
MSE decomposition 
Regression Disturbance Accuracy 
U 
0.039 0.927 0.0700 
0.118 0.543 0.0331 
0.188 0-772 0.1214 
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The ability of the model to duplicate turning points or rapid changes in the 
actual data of all endogenous variables will be examined by looking at Figures 6.1 
to 6.14. We observe that the simulated series do seem to reproduce the general 
long-run behavior of the actual series, although a few short-run fluctuations in the 
actual series are not reproduced. It is also clear that the endogenous variables in 
the demand sector, in general, simulate the actual series better than the endogenous 
variables in the supply sector. This may be due to the fact that agricultural supply 
is subject to higher risk and uncertainty than the demand sector. However, the 
demand sector of the model is not independent of the supply sector since factors 
affecting supply also affect the demand sector in this simultaneous equation system. 
Moreover, as mentioned in previous chapters, some factors from world markets are 
uncertain and unexpectable. As a result, most variables tend to have equal short-run 
fluctuations. The missed turning point errors ranged from a low of 2 on RCAHUS 
to a high of 7 on RCFOUS. 
For the acreage planted,, the simulated values are closer to the actual values 
over the entire period. By far the biggest difference between the actual and sim­
ulated values of planted acreage is in 1980. This might be due to the larger price 
fluctuation because of unexpected foreign import demand in this period. Acreage 
harvested relatively performs better than acreage planted. Yields and total pro­
duction perform well barring minor turning point errors. A relatively poor job 
seems to have been done in tracking the domestic food demand; it might be due to 
the identity equation. The variable used for the market-clearing identity absorbs 
all disturbance errors in the system. The commercial exports and private ending 
stocks perform extremely well. Farm price has three turning errors in 1982, 1984, 
and 1985; however, the sharp increases in U.S. farm price in 1973 and 1980 are pre­
dicted very well. Both wholesale and U.S. export price have perfect fit ,except for 
the small difference since 1981. Thailand export price has no turning point errors. 
Other endogenous variables, such as expected net returns, expected gross returns, 
and government deficiency payments, have performed remarkably well. In general, 
results suggest that some headway has been made in predicting the actual values 
by the construction of the econometric model. 
The stability of the model is analyzed by calculating the characteristic roots 
from the characteristic equation that is derived from the model. If the model is large 
and nonlinear, calculating the characteristic roots becomes a cumbersome task. In 
such cases, the best one can do to determine whether or not the model is stable in 
the long term is to simulate the model over a long period of time (see Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1981). Hence, a good fit of the model would imply the model is stable. 
Thus, the above dynamic historical simulation of the model over the entire period 
indicates the model is stable. 
Other ways of testing the model stability is to perform a series of simulations, 
over different periods of time and using different time paths for the exogenous 
variables in the model. For the present case, the Thailand export tax in 1973 
is exogenously decreased by 10-percent to test the stability of the model. If the 
changes in the endogenous variables to this shock decline as time passes, and the 
simulation values move back to base values, then the model is stable. The faster 
the adjustment back toward the base simulation values, the more stable the model. 
Table 6.3: Dynamic impacts of a decrease in the Thailand export tax by ten per­
cent in 1973 















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.3 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 















































































































































































































0.00 102.18 171.26 
0,00 3.14 -0.89 
0.00 3.07 -0.52 
171.89 343.46 374.00 
-3.65 2.91 0.00 
-2.13 0.84 0.00 
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Figure 6.2: Predicted versus actual values of acreage harvested 
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Figure 6.4; Predicted versus actual values of total production 
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Figure 6.12: Predicted versus actual values of expected net returns 
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Figure 6.14: Predicted versus actual values of U.S. Government deficiency pay­
ments 
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The year 1973 was chosen because that was the year Thailand Government imposed 
big export tax. It came from the sharp increase in world rice price in 1973. Thus, 
we would expect the changes in the export tax of Thailand to have effect on the 
endogenous variables through the Thailand export price equation. Given this shock, 
the simulation is rerun over the period of 1973 to 1985. Table 6.3 reports the base 
simulated values and the changes in the values of the endogenous variables from 
the base solution due to the Thailand export tax decrease in 1973. The percentage 
change of all variables decreases as time passes, and all simulated results eventually 
approach the base solution. 
As discussed in the theoretical formulation, the immediate effect of the Thai­
land export tax decrease will be on the Thailand export price. Thailand export 
price plays the key role on the U.S. export price and so also on U.S. commercial 
exports. The percentage change of Thailand price steadily declines from -8.28 per­
cent to 0 percent from 1973 to 1985. The U.S. export price change also declines by 
-6.04 percent in 1973 and steadily decreases to zero in 1985. 
The effect of the decrease in the Thailand export tax on the U.S. rice industry 
is transmitted through Thailand export price. A detailed analysis of the changes in 
the U.S. rice industry due to different exogenous shocks, including Thailand export 
tax scenario, will be discussed in the next chapter. However, the important point 
to note at present is that the fluctuation response of the endogenous variables to 
the exogenous shock declines from 1973 to 1985. Since most of the variables move 
back to their equilibrium values after the decrease in the Thailand export tax, the 
model is stable. 
In summary, the results suggest that the model does an excellent job of de­
4 
4 
picting the behavior of endogenous variables. The model appears to provide a good 
foundation upon which to base further empirical research. In'the next chapter, dy­
namic properties of the system will be more closely investigated through simulation 
analysis. Several interesting policy questions will be evaluated empirically. 
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r SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND 
FOREIGN DEMAND FLUCTUATIONS 
This chapter analyzes the impacts of world import demand and policy changes 
of the two biggest rice exporting countries, i.e., U.S. and Thailand, on the U.S. 
rice industry. Hypothetical changes in economic and policy factors of interest were 
adopted, individually, to perform dynamic simulations using the estimated model 
described in Chapter 5. The comparison of the dynamic simulation results with and 
without a given event or policy shows the impact of such an event or policy. Three 
scenarios are examined. First, a Thailand export policy of sustained decrease in 
the export tax by ten percent from 1973 to 1985 and, secondly, a sustained increase 
in total production of major rice importing countries (i.e., which implies a decrease 
in the U.S. and Thailand export demands) by ten percent from 1973 to 1985, are 
investigated. Finally, the U.S. farm policy of a sustained decrease in the target price 
by ten percent from 1977 to 1985 is also investigated. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, these policy and event variables are selected because 





7.1 Analysis of Thailand Export Tax Decrease 
Table 7.1 reports the simulation results of the Thailand export tax decrease for 
all endogenous variables. Since the export tax rate is altered every year from 1973 to 
1985 by the Thailand Government, simulation result will have compounding effects 
on the endogenous variables. That is, the consequent changes in the endogenous 
variables in any period will include the dynamic effects of the decrease in Thailand 
export taxes of all previous periods. 
As explained in previous chapters, reducing Thailand export taxes sets lower 
export prices of Thailand. Then not only does Thailand occupy some portion of U.S. 
export shares, but also U.S. has to bear lower export prices. In the simulation, the 
decreased Thailand export price ranged from a low of 5.60 percent in 1985 to a high 
of 8.71 percent in 1974. The decrease in Thailand export taxes has also a negative 
effect on U.S. export price. The percentage change in the U.S. export price declined 
by -6.04 percent in 1973 to -3.59 percent in 1985. On average a ten percent decrease 
in Thailand export taxes influenced Thailand export price by about 8 percent and 
U.S. export price by 5.5 percent. Therefore, U.S. commercial exports were affected 
negatively because the decreasing rate of Thailand export price was bigger than 
that of U.S. export price. The percentage change in the commercial exports ranged 
from a low of -1.82 in 1982 to a high of -10.05 in 1985. However, domestic food 
consumption and private stocks have positive effects, with decreasing rates, by the 
decrease in the Thailand export tax. Thus, there is a demand redistribution in the 
U.S. rice market, i.e., increase in domestic food consumption and private stocks, 
and decrease in commercial. 




harvested acreage, yields, and total production are relatively small or zero (see 
Table 7.1). The percentage changes in those variables are mostly less than one. 
The supply side is affected by Thailand export tax policy, indirectly, through U.S. 
farm price, while the demand side is directly affected through U.S. and Thailand 
export prices. Therefore, the impact of Thailand export policy on the supply side is 
smaller than that on the demand side. Moreover, even though U.S. farm price has 
relatively high negative effects by a -4.2 percent on average, the percentage changes 
in supply is low, because target price sets the price floor when U.S. farm price turns 
down below the target price. 
The percentage changes in expected gross returns for rice producers ranged 
from a low of -0.34 in 1985 to a high of -7.70 in 1978. That is because both prices 
and supply decrease. Even though U.S. Government deficiency payments increase 
in some years, negative effects from low prices and supply dominates the deficiency 
payments effect and, hence, farmers' expected returns have negative effects. The 
percentage changes in U.S. Government deficiency payments ranged from a low of 
5.60 in 1981 to a high of 189.55 in 1979 except some zero effects. 
The impact of this Thailand export tax policy on farm (or wholesale) price, 
equilibrium quantities of rice supply, food demand, stocks, and exports, are exactly 
matched with the hypothesis in Chapter 3. The impacts are traced in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.1 represents that U.S. export demand shifts down because Thailand oc­
cupies some portion of U.S. export share by cutting their export tax. This result 
corresponds to a leftward shift of the market demand curve from Dq to D\ and a 
decrease of farm prices from Pq to Pj. The decrease of the market price induces 
the incentives of domestic consumers to consume and of stock-holders to have more 
stocks. And the decrease of prices reduces the incentive of farmers to plant. There­
fore, the new equilibrium is at E-y, which is the result of cutting Thailand export 
taxes in and prior to a selected year. 
The long-run elasticities of endogenous variables, with respect to Thailand 
export tax decreases, are reported in Table 7.2. The long-run elasticities of rice 
supply associated with a 1-percent decrease in the Thailand export tax are inelastic, 
i.e., less than 0.1-percent. The long-run elasticities of rice demand, particularly 
domestic food consumption and commercial exports (0.34 and -0.37 respectively), 
are relatively more elastic than those of supply. At 0.12, the elasticity of private 
stocks with respect to Thailand export tax decrease is less elastic than those of 
other demand variables. 
The elasticities of U.S. and Thailand export prices associated with a 1-percent 
decrease in the Thailand export tax are -0.56, -0.77 respectively, which are relatively 
more elastic than those of any other variables, except U.S. Government deficiency 
payments. These more elastic responses are as anticipated because both prices are 
directly affected by Thailand export tax policy. The long-run elasticities of both 
farm price and wholesale price are -0.42. Another interesting result is the value of 
1.28 for long-run elasticity of U.S. Government deficiency payments, which implies 
that changes in Thailand export policies have significant effects on the U.S. rice 
commodity program. 
In reviewing the results of this simulation analysis, several observations are 
suggested. First, the Thailand export tax has significant effects on U.S. export 
price, through Thailand export price. Downward pressure on the U.S. export price 
affects the competitive position of U.S. rice exports in the international market. 
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However, U.S. exports decrease, because quantity of the U.S. exports are dependent 
on the Thailand export price as well as the U.S. export price, and the decreasing 
rate of Thailand export price is bigger than that of U.S. export price. 
Second, as the result of decreasing U.S. exports, the Thailand export tax policy 
performs the redistribution of domestic demand, i.e., domestic food consumption 
and private stocks holding, in the U.S. rice market. Lowering domestic prices make 
domestic demand increase. Furthermore, low domestic prices induce the incentives 
of farmers to plant less. 
Finally, reducing the Thailand export tax causes expected returns for rice farm­
ers to decline, and U.S. Government deficiency payments to rise. This foreign policy 
induces the U.S. Government to have more burden, because, given a fixed target 
price, the decreasing farm price causes more participants in the U.S. rice program. 
Therefore, Thailand export tax policy has significant effects on the U.S. rice econ­
omy. 
Table 7.1: Dynamic impacts of a decrease in the Thailand export tax by ten per 
cent from 1973 to 1985 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.1 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 













Base 28.96 22.76 
Change -1,75 -1,47 
% change -6.04 -6.45 
BASE 26.43 20.81 
Change -2.19 -1.81 
% change -8.28 -8.71 
Base 381.5 287.9 
Change -19.42 -18.05 
% change -5.09 -6.27 
Base 153.8 245.1 
Change 0.62 -6.19 
% change . 0.41 -2.52 
Base 0.00 0.00 
Change 0.00 0.00 
% change 0.00 0.00 
19.31 15.38 19.90 
-1.15 -0.84 -1.22 
-5.97 -5.47 -6.13 
14.02 13.44 15.48 
-1.19 -0.99 -1.32 
-8.52 -7.34 -8.51 
261.4 126.1 246.6 
-18.41 -11.42 -19.00 
-7.05 -9.05 -7.70 
300.4 310.3 225.1 
-13.03 -18.63 -15.96 
-4.34 -6.00 -7.09 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
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27.44 13.90 0.00 102.18 171.26 171.89 343.46 374.00 
0.00 26.34 0.00 5.73 47.63 33.67 41.35 0.00 
0.00 189.55 0.00 5.60 27.81 19.59 12.04 0.00 
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Table 7.2: Dynamic elasticities of a sustained decrease in the Thailand export tax 
by ten percent 
Variable Long-run elasticity^ 
Acreage planted (1000 acres) -0.06 
Acreage harvested (1000 acres) -0.06 
Yields per acre (lbs) " 0 
Total production (1000 cwt.) -0.05 
Domestic food consumption (1000 cwt.) 0.34 
Commercial exports (1000 cwt) -0.37 
Private stocks (1000 cwt) 0.12 
Farm price ($/cwt.) -0.42 
Wholesale price ($/cwt.) -0.42 
U.S. export price ($/cwt.) -0.56 
Thailand export price ($/cwt.) -0.77 
Expected net returns ($/acre) -0.44 
Expected gross returns ($/acre) -0.42 
Government deficiency payments (million dollars) 1.28 
®Calculated as average changes of endogenous variables divided by 
average changes of the Thailand export tax, and evaluated at the 
mean over the period 1973-1985. 
114 
7.2 Analysis of Foreign Demand Decrease 
The second policy scenario examines the effect of expansionary total produc­
tion of major importing countries. Increased total production of importers implies 
decreased export demand of major exporters. The dynamic simulation results of a 
increase in total production of major importing countries by 10-percent from 1973 
to 1985 are reported in Table 7.3. 
As explained in Chapter 3, shifting down the export demand facing duopolist, 
i.e., Thailand and U.S., causes export price and quantity of exports to fall. In turn 
decreased U.S. export price causes domestic prices (i.e., farm price and wholesale 
price) to fall. As a result, domestic food consumption and stocks rise. But U.S. 
acreage planted and total production fall. Expected returns for rice farmers have a 
negative effect because of lower farm price and lower export demand. Thus the U.S. 
Government has a burden to release more deficiency payments for rice farmers. 
In the simulation, this foreign demand decrease scenario has exactly the same 
effect as the Thailand export tax scenario had. However, the magnitude of the 
impacts of this scenario are much smaller, i.e., less percentage changes. The per­
centage changes in the U.S. export price and Thailand export price, by a ten percent 
increase in the total production of major importers, are a high of -1.73 percent in 
1984 and -2.08 percent in 1985, respectively. The percentage changes in most of 
the variables are less than 0.1 percent except Government deficiency payments with 
a 0.41 percent change. Like the results from the Thailand export tax policy, the 





Table 7.3: Dynamic impacts of a sustained increase in the total production of 
major importers by ten percent from 1973 to 1985 



































































































































































































































































































Table 7.3 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 













Base 28.96 22.76 
Change -0.14 -0.16 
% change -0.49 -0.72 
BASE 26.43 20.81 
Change -0.18 -0.20 
% change -0.66 -0.98 
Base 381.5 287.9 
Change -1.60 -2.00 
% change -0.42 -0.69 
Base 153.8 245.1 
Change 0.62 -0.24 
% change 0.41 -0.10 
Base 0.00 0.00 
Change 0.00 0.00 
% change 0.00 0.00 
19.31 15.38 19.90 
-0.21 -0.21 -0.26 
-1.08 -1.35 -1.29 
14.02 13.44 15.48 
-0.21 -0.23 -0.24 
- -1,50 -1.71 -1.57 
261.4 126.1 246.6 
-3.45 -3.10 -4.65 
-1,32 -2.46 -1.88 
300.4 310.3 225.1 
-1.74 -2.35 -2.85 
-0.58 -0.76 -1.27 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
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0.00 102.18 171.26 
0.00 5.73 12.62 
0.00 5.60 7.37 
171.89 343.46 374.00 
7.61 20.72 0.00 
4.42 6.03 0.00 
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Table 7.4: Dynamic elasticities of a sustained increase in the total production of 
major importers by ten percent 
Variable Long-run elasticity" 
Acreage planted (1000 acres) -0.01 
Acreage harvested (1000 acres) -0.01 
Yields per acre (lbs) 0 
Total production (1000 cwt.) -0.01 
Domestic food consumption (1000 cwt.) 0.07 
Commercial exports (1000 cwt) -0.07 
Private stocks (1000 cwt) 0.03 
Farm price ($/cwt.) -0.09 
Wholesale price ($/cwt.) . -0.09 
U.S. export price ($/cwt.) -0.11 
Thailand export price ($/cwt.) -0.13 
Expected net returns ($/acre) -0.08 
Expected gross returns ($/acre) -0.08 
Government deficiency payments (million dollars) 0.41 
'^Calculated as average changes of endogenous variables divided by 
average changes of the total production of major importers, and 
evaluated at the mean over the period 1973-1985. 
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The impact of foreign demand decreases on prices, equilibrium quantities of 
rice supply, domestic demand, stocks, and exports, can be analyzed with the help 
of Figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 represents that U.S. export demand shifts down because of 
decreased world demand. This result corresponds to a leftward shift of the market 
demand curve from DQ to D\ and a decrease of farm prices from Pg to Pj in the 
U.S. rice market. The decrease in market price induces the incentives of domestic 
consumers to consume and of stock-holders to have more stocks. And the decrease 
of prices reduces the Incentives of farmers to plant. Therefore, the new equilibrium 
is at El, which is the result of foreign demand decreases in and prior to a selected 
year. 
The long-run elasticities of endogenous variables, with respect to an increase 
in importers' total production, are reported in Table 7.4. The long-run elasticities 
of rice supply associated with a 1-percent increase in the total production of rhajor 
importing countries are very inelastic, i.e., less than 0.01-percent. The long-run 
elasticities of rice demand, particularly domestic food consumption, commercial, 
and private stocks, are also very inelastic, i.e., less than 0.1-percent. The elasticities 
of U.S. and Thailand export prices associated with a 1-percent increase in the total 
production of major importers are -0.11 and -0.13 respectively, which are relatively 
more elastic than those of any others, except U.S. Government deficiency payments. 
Another interesting result is the value of 0.41 for the long-run elasticity of U.S. 
Government deficiency payments, which implies that world demand fluctuation have 
relatively significant effects on the U.S. rice program. 
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7.3 Analysis of U.S. Target Price Decrease 
The simulation results of sustained decreases in the target price by ten percent 
from 1977 to 1985 are reported in Table 7.5. Since the inauguration of the target 
price program in 1976, the years from 1977 to 1985 were selected. 
A ten percent decrease of the target price causes farmers to plant less, owing 
to a decrease in the expected gross returns, which leads total rice supply to be 
less. The percentage change in the acreage planted continues to rise from -0.08 
percent in 1978 to -3.58 percent in 1985. Thus, the percentage change in the total 
production also continués to rise from -0.08 percent in 1978 to -3.52 percent in 
1985. Given everything else unchanged, there is less rice available for domestic food 
consumption, exports, and carryover. The tight supply results in increases in the 
farm price. Lower rice supply also results in a higher wholesale price. Therefore, 
lower expected returns for rice farmers are expected, whereas the U.S. Government 
deficiency payments continue to fall from -100.00 percent in 1979 to -35.99 percent 
in 1985. 
The impact of this contractionary target price policy on supply, demand, stocks, 
exports, and prices, can be analyzed with the help of Figure 3.5. A decrease of the 
target price causes a decrease in expected returns, which leads acreage planted less 
and hence lower rice supply. Therefore, the supply curve shifts from SQ to SI 
in Figure 3.5. Since graphical analysis does not permit to analyze the dynamic 
changes in the endogenous variables over time, the year 1985 is chosen to examine 
the changes in the endogenous variables. 
Table 7.5: Dynamic impacts of a sustained decrease in the target price by ten 
percent from 1977 to 1985 




































































































































































































































































































Table 7.5 (Continued) 
Variable Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 





































































































































































Table 7.6: Dynamic elasticities of a sustained decrease in the U.S. target price by 
ten percent 
Variable Long-run elasticity" 
Acreage planted (1000 acres) -0.10 
Acreage harvested (1000 acres) -0.10 
Yields per acre (lbs) 0.00 
Total production (1000 cwt.) -0.10 
Domestic food consumption (1000 cwt.) -0.05 
Commercial exports (1000 cwt) -0.16 
Private stocks (1000 cwt) -0.41 
Farm price ($/cwt.) 0.11 
Wholesale price ($/cwt.) 0.11 
U.S. export price ($/cwt.) 0.06 
Thailand export price ($/cwt.) 0.00^ 
Expected net returns ($/acre) -1.05 
Expected gross returns (S/acre) -0.77 
Government deficiency payments (million dollars) -5.65 
®Calculated as average changes of endogenous variables divided by 
average changes of the target price, and evaluated at the mean 
over the period 1977-1985. 
("Target price has a positive effect on the Thailand export price, 
but the long-run elasticity is close to zero. 
J5L-_ 
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In the year 1985, the new equilibrium is at which is the result of a target 
price decrease in 1985 and also prior to 1985. At this equilibrium, the farm price 
rises to Pj, i.e., by 6.47 percent (refer to Table 7.5). This rise in the farm price 
is caused by the decrease in the supply schedule. The equilibrium quantities of 
domestic food consumption and stock inventories decline by -2.29 percent and -
7.19 percent respectively, because of the higher price. The equilibrium quantity of 
commercial exports also declines by -16.14 percent, which implies that commercial 
exports are very sensitive to changes in domestic prices as well as U.S. export price. 
Given this decrease in the equilibrium quantities and increase in prices, we would 
anticipate the expected returns for rice farmers and U.S. Government deficiency 
payments to fall. Thus, it is clear that rice farmers are hurt by decreases in target 
price, through less deficiency payments. 
The long-run elasticities of endogenous variables with respect to target price 
decreases are reported in Table 7.6. The long-run elasticities of acreage planted, 
acreage harvested, and total production associated with a 1-percent decrease in 
the target price are inelastic at -0.1. This inelastic response is anticipated because 
there is only one year (1978), before 1981, when target price was in effect in the 
rice market. Another important result is the long-run elasticities of the expected 
(net) returns for rice farmers and U.S. Government deficiency payments are -1.05 
and -5.65, respectively, which implies that the changes in target price policies have 
significant effects on the rice farmers and U.S. Government expenditures for the rice 
program. Furthermore, from the above results, a decrease in the target price policy 
does not favor the rice producing farmers by decreasing their returns without any 
other support schemes. 
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8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Government intervention in the U.S. agricultural sector has a long history over 
the last five decades. This continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. farm policy. Gov­
ernment commodity programs have both direct and indirect effects on farmers, 
consumers, and taxpayers. Export-oriented policies of Thailand can also have dra­
matic consequences on supply, demand, and prices in the U.S. rice industry, and 
hence it has also indirect effects on farmers, consumers, and taxpayers in the U.S. 
rice economy. Furthermore, small swings in the stream of imports causes U.S. agri­
cultural policies to reform because the U.S. rice industry heavily depends upon the 
world rice market, with more than 60 percent of national rice production as an out­
let for exports. Thus a sudden world demand fluctuation will affect domestic and 
world price, equilibrium quantities of rice supply-demand, and in turn U.S. farmers' 
expected returns and U.S. Government expenditures. 
Under a Stackelberg duopoly assumption, Thailand as a price-leader and U.S. 
as a price-follower, an economic supply-demand model that represents economic 
forces acting in the U.S. rice industry was formulated. The general concerns of this 
study are to examine the effects of alternative policies of U.S. and Thailand, and 
world demand fluctuations on U.S. rice economy by using this economic framework. 




variables involved in the U.S. rice economy were presented in Chapter 2. The 
theoretical model with U.S. and Thailand policy mechanisms in the world rice 
market was illustrated in Chapter 3. The structural framework for U.S. rice market 
was then developed, based upon prior information and economic theory, in the 
following chapter. 
Since the model was nonlinear and simultaneous, nonlinear three-stage least 
squares from SAS/ETS was adopted to estimate the model in Chapter 5. The 
sample period of the study was 1960 - 1985 using annual data. The performance 
of the model was evaluated by its ability to reproduce the actual data in an ex-
post simulation, the validity of its estimates, and its stability in Chapter 6. The 
estimated directional relationships among variables were consistent with a priori 
expectations, and the estimated coefficients had good statistical properties. The 
dynamic historical simulation over the entire study period to test the validity of 
the model proved satisfactory, and tracked the turning points of the endogenous 
variables very well. Moreover, in one period, the exogenous shock of a decrease 
in the Thailand export tax in 1972, showed the convergence of equilibrium values, 
indicating the model was stable. 
To examine the effects of changes in economic and policy instruments of interest 
such as U.S. Government support price, export tax of Thailand Government, and 
world demand fluctuations on supply, demand, prices, U.S. Government program 
costs (i.e., deficiency payments), and the expected returns for rice farmers in the 
U.S. rice market, dynamic simulations were performed in Chapter 7. 
Several conclusions, from the estimated results and the simulation experiments, 




First, all the estimated coefficients of the variables have the right signs and are 
statistically significant and, thus, this study has provided important information to' 
analyze the U.S. rice market related to the world rice market, including the supply 
and demand conditions of the rice industry, price linkages between domestic and 
world markets, and the world demand situation and agricultural policies of U.S. 
and Thailand affecting the U.S. rice market. 
Second, considering the significance of Thailand export policy to the U.S. 
rice market, this study endogenizes the Thailand export price using a Stackelberg 
duopoly model to world equilibrium price determination. All the explanatory vari­
ables in the export price equations of both U.S. and Thailand have the expected 
signs and are highly significant. Moreover, the U.S. export price elasticity with 
respect to Thailand export price is 0.75, which implies the U.S. export price is 
sensitive to change in Thailand export prices. Therefore, the results lend support 
to the Stackelberg duopoly approach, Thailand as a price-leader and U.S. as a 
price-follower. 
Third, the simulation experiments suggest that the Thailand export tax has 
much more significant impacts on the U.S. rice market than the other two factors 
(i.e.. World demand fluctuation and U.S. support price). Looking at the percentage 
changes in supply, demand, expected returns for farmers, and U.S. Government 
deficiency payments, the Thailand export tax has the largest impact upon the U.S. 
rice economy. Furthermore, U.S. target price has a little larger impact than world 
demand fluctuations. These imply direct government interventions bring more ef­
fective results. 




export price. The lower world demand, caused by the higher total production 
of major importing countries, results in reduction of U.S. exports and expected 
returns to farmers, and, hence rice farmers produce less rice and join the government 
program more. Therefore, U.S. Government has to take more expenditures and to 
reform the agricultural policies. 
Fifth, the effect of a lower target price policy suggests that such policy action 
has a negative impact on the rice farmers and consumers. A deduction in the level 
of the target price increases the farm price and export price, but decreases U.S. 
Government expenditure and returns to farmers. However, the magnitude of the 
effect on Government expenditure is extremely larger than any other negative effects 
on farmers and consumers. 
Sixth, the supply elasticities to all of the policy shocks are relatively low. The 
most common approach used to incorporate the influence of commodity program 
is the inclusion of effective support payment and diversion payment variables as 
explanatory variables in the planted acres equations (De Gorter and Paddock, 1985; 
Skold and Westhoff, 1987). That is, acreage controls in the estimates of supply 
response are implicitly, not explicitly, included. Perhaps it is a reason for the 
relatively low elasticities of supply in this study. 
Finally, expected returns for rice producers and U.S. Government deficiency 
payments, comparing to any other variables, are more sensitive for all poHcy sce­
narios mentioned above. The result can be explained by the fact that expected 
returns and U.S. Government deficiency payment variables absorb all price and 
quantity changes directly in the model. 
In reality, when one allows market conditions to change, the effects of such 
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policies depend upon how such market conditions interact upon each other. It also 
depends upon the perception of economic agents on the government policy. If eco­
nomic agents perceive that such a policy is permanent, farmers' decisions to plant 
will reveal more of market conditions. It is also an incentive for them to improve 
the input mix in order to reduce cost of production, if they want to remain com­
petitive. Simulation results indicate that an aggressive export policy of Thailand, 
an expansionary total production policy of major importers, and market-oriented 
policies of the U.S. Government, might seem to hurt the rice farmers because of 
the lower farm price and supply, and hence loss of expected returns to rice farmers. 
Therefore, as the level of government support drops, the incentive to participate in 
the government program will be lower. 
Even though the results of this study were statistically satisfactory and all 
the objectives were accomplished, there are some areas which can be explored for 
further research. First, the Thailand export price equation was integrated into the 
U.S. rice model in this study, but it was not thoroughly explored. More specific 
characteristics of oligopolistic (or duopolistic) market could be incorporated in the 
model oased on a further detailed study of the behaviors of large rice exporters and 
importers in the world. Addition of these markets would give a better picture to 
analyze the U.S. rice industry in the world market. 
Second, since government exports are not endogenized, this study does not 
take into account the total government expenditure, and the impacts of policy 
alternatives is examined only on government deficiency payments, not on total ex­
penditures. The rice exports can be roughly divided into the commercial trade and 




methods of determining price and quantity in the two types of rice trade seem to be 
very different, the economic model should be improved so that it will explain these 
two types of rice exports simultaneously. 
Third, because other food crops such as wheat and corn have great effects on 
the domestic rice market as well as on the world market, it is appropriate to expand 
the economic model so that it can handle not only the rice market but also markets 
in the other crops and the interrelations among these markets. 
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